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CIVIL CONSPIRACY AND INTERFERENCE
WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many injuries which fall within the category of "business
torts." Although the term has not acquired a crystallized definition,'
its grasp comprehends the torts of unfair competition, trade libel, appro-
priation of trade secrets, boycotts, injurious falsehood, interference with
contractual relations, interference with prospective business advantage,
and other deprivations of the right to conduct a business, trade, or occu-
pation without unjustified interference. 2 While many business torts
cause injuries to a businessman in the form of a taking or destruction of
his property without affecting his trade relations with others,s quite
often other business torts will result in injuries to a businessman's rela-
tional interests-with the public, with certain individuals, or with other
1. Weber, The Reasons Behind the Rules in the Law of Business Torts, 38 NEn. L.
REv. 608 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Weber].
2. 1 R. CALLMANN, ThE LAw OF UNFAR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPO-
LIES 28 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as CALLMANNI. The author states:
The right to conduct any lawful business is generally, if not universally, recognized
as "property" within the due process clause of the Constitution and "elucidation is
not needed to make it plain that the right to carry on a lawful business is a valu-
able right which a court of equity will protect against unwarranted interference or
undue obstruction."
Id. (footnotes omitted). For a listing of various business torts, see M. HANDLER, CASES
AND MATrEmS ON BusmEss TORTS (1972); Weber, supra note 1, at 609.
3. Many of the trade secret and misappropriation cases which involve the taking by
the defendant of a property right from the plaintiff are considered a more direct and
simple form of injury which may be characterized as "commercial larceny." These in-
juries do not necessarily affect the plaintiff's trade relations with third persons or the
public at large. See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215
(1918); Julius Hyman & Co. v. Velsicol Corp., 233 P.2d 977 (Colo. 1951); Diodes v.
Franzen, 260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19 (1968); cases collected in K. YORK
& I. BAUMAN, RMEDIms, CASES AND MATEmALS 558-79 (2d ed. 1973).
Although the tort of conversion is also analogous, it contemplates the taking of tangi-
ble personal property or intangible property, the rights to which are customarily merged
or identified with some document. Professor Prosser suggests the analogy as well as
the reason why it remains but a theory:
There is perhaps no very valid and essential reason why there might not be conver-
sion of an ordinary debt; the goodwill of a business, or even an idea, or "any spe-
cies of personal property which is the subject of private ownership," but thus far
other remedies apparently have been adequate, and there has been no particular
need or demand for any extension of the rather drastic relief of conversion beyond
rights customarily represented by documents.
W. PRossm, Tnn LAW OF TORTS 82-83 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
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business organizations. 4  Two of these business torts, however, may be
distinguished from the rest on the basis of the interests which are in-
jured and which the courts endeavor to protect. These are inter-
ference with contractual relations and interference with prospective
business advantage. These two latter torts represent injuries to specif-
ically identifiable business relationships as contrasted with those in-
juries to a general relationship with such members of the public as may
be expected to deal with the party injured.5
Despite the classification by some of the torts of interference with
contractual and prospective business relations as part of the law of un-
fair competition,6 these torts have come to be regarded as a separate
and special kind of wrong by virtue of the interests affected.' In the
realm of injuries to relational interests, the law of unfair competition
seems to play a predominant role in redressing injuries to a man's "cus-
tom"'8 or general business goodwill.9 Yet the torts of interference with
contractual and prospective business relations have traditionally been
4. See generally Green, Relational Interests (pts. 1 & 2), 29 ILL. L. REV. 1041, 30
ILL. L. REv. 1 (1935).
5. PRossER, supra note 3, at 915.
6. One treatise writer has claimed that "[iWnducing the breach of contract in a com-
petitive context is always unfair competition." 2 CALLmA NN, supra note 2, at 20 (foot-
note omitted); see J. CALnmAFDE, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAm COMPETITION 351 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as CAmAFDE1].
7. As one commentator has stated:
After considerable hesitation our law has come to recognize and to give legal pro-
tection to a proprietary interest in contract relationships. So far has this develop-
ment now gone that mere competition is under no circumstances a justification for
inducing breach of contract. However, it is to be noted that the basis of relief is
found in the invasion of the proprietary interest in the existent contract and not
in an unjustifiable invasion of the general interest in freedom to enter into business
relationships. In other words, inducing breach of contract is itself regarded as a
special kind of wrong rather than as merely one species of unfair competition.
Grismore, Are Unfair Methods of Competition Actionable at the Suit of a Competitor?,
33 MicK. L. REv. 321, 326 (1935) (footnotes omitted).
8. 37 Mica. L. REv. 115, 117 (1938). The author distinguishes between two kinds
of business interferences which have not reached the contract stage: (1) those growing
out of the goodwill developed between the tradesman and his customers or an employer
and -his employees through an established course of dealing, and (2) those growing out
of negotiations for an isolated contract between parties who have had no regular course
of dealing. The author refers to interference with an "established course of dealing not
resting on contract as deprivation of a man's 'custom.'" Id., citing May v. Wood, 51
N.E. 191 (Mass. 1898).
9. 1 CALLmANN, supra note 2, at 36. The author explains: "The occasion is rare,
indeed, when an act of unfair competition will not affect the goodwill of a business, 'the
basis of the action of unfair competition .[being the] protection of goodwill.'" Id. at
31. Apart from the injuries to a plaintiff's goodwill, many of the cases also place empha-
sis upon the direct injury to the public caused by deception. See CALn.imAnr, supra note
6, at 267.
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limited to injuries either to existing contractual relations or to relations
which would probably take contractual forml°-that is, relations creat-
ing specifically identifiable expectancies. There may be, however, a
considerable overlap between interference with contractual and pros-
pective business relations and other business torts."
It is the purpose of this Comment to discuss both the concept of civil
conspiracy and the tort of interference with contractual relations. More
specifically, this Comment will focus on a divergence of opinion engen-
10. In order to establish causation for the tort of interference with prospective busi-
ness relations the plaintiff must show not only that he was "about to" but also that he
"would," but for the unlawful interference, have entered into the contract. See Moreno
v. Marbil Prods., Inc., 296 F.2d 543, 545 (2d Cir. 1961); Lewis v. Bloede, 202 F. 7,
17 (4th Cir. 1912); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great W. Fin. Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 305,
319, 444 P.2d 481, 490, 70 Cal. Rptr. 849, 858 (1968); Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal.
App, 2d 472, 473, 28 Cal. Rptr. 898, 899 (1963); Union Car Advertising Co. v. Collier,
189 N.E. 463, 469 (N.Y. 1934). See also Wilson v. Loews, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 183,
191-94, 298 P.2d 152, 158-60 (1956); Campbell v. Raybum, 129 Cal. App. 2d 232, 234-
35, 276 P.2d 671-72 (1954); Goldman v. Feinberg, 37 A.2d 355, 356 (Conn. 1944).
The rationale for this requirement of a "but for" showing is stated in Union Car Ad-
vertising Co. v. Collier, 189 N.E. 463 (N.Y. 1934):
There must be some certainty that the plaintiff would have gotten the contract but
for the fraud. This cannot be left to surmise or speculation .... The courts will
be a little slow in permitting juries to speculate upon what a competitor had reason
to expect or might reasonably suppose would happen. The expressions "reasonable
expectation" or "reasonably certain" may not be as precise as "would have re-
ceived," and we think the latter words are preferable.
Id. at 470.
Perhaps a more analytical explanation may be found in an article wherein the author,
having distinguished between interferences with established business customs and inter-
ferences with isolated relationships which have not reached the contract stage, stated:
In the former case [interference with established business custom], the plaintiff has
an established good will resulting from a course of dealing with his employees or
with a clientele of customers who regularly patronize his business. His prospective
economic advantages in the form of future contracts are fairly predictable and cer-
tain. Therefore, the courts are not speculating when they give him relief against
a defendant who has maliciously interfered with his business. On the other hand,
the man who is negotiating for the sale of property, or for a particular contract,
in an isolated instance is not so certain of success. In the early stages of his efforts
it is not so certain that damage has been caused him if a rival gets the business,
since it is by no means certain he would have succeeded had there been no inter-
ference by this defendant. But if the plaintiff has so far advanced in his negotia-
tions that it can be said that but for the fraudulent acts of the defendant he would
have completed the contract, the situation comes very close to that of interference
with established business custom.
37 McH. L. Rlv. 115, 119 (1938).
11. The same acts which constitute interference with a businessman's custom or good-
will may simultaneously constitute interference with contractual or prospective business
relations. For example, X, a competitor of Y, falsely disparages Y's products before a
meeting of a large number of community businessmen, some of whom either have con-
tracts with Y to purchase Y's products or are negotiating to purchase Y's products. The
same act which may destroy or impair Y's goodwill in the community, if intended to
cause Y's current customers to terminate relations with Y, may constitute interference
with contractual or prospective business relations, as well as trade libel.
CIVIL CONSPIRACY
dered by the application of the concept of civil conspiracy to the tort
of interference with contractual relations.
11. CIvIL CONSPIRACY
A. A Definition
The concept of conspiracy had its birth in the English common law
in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries."2 Although the
criminal action of conspiracy underwent rapid growth at early common
law, 3 the concept of civil conspiracy was not widely accepted until the
latter part of the eighteenth century.' 4
Any instructive discussion of the law of civil conspiracy requires an
attempt to distinguish it from the law of criminal conspiracy. Often
a broad definition is used to describe both criminal and civil conspiracy,
i.e., a combination between two or more persons to accomplish a crimi-
nal or unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by criminal or unlawful
means.' 5 Although this definition is widely used, it does not com-
pletely state the elements required to show either a criminal or a civil
conspiracy. At common law, a criminal conspiracy would exist if there
were two or more persons, an unlawful object to be accomplished or
a lawful object to be accomplished by unlawful means, and an agree-
ment or meeting of the minds on the object or course of action.' 6 The
mere combination for an illegal purpose without an additional "overt
act" was sufficient to establish guilt. This is still the law where un-
changed by statute.' 7  In the field of criminal law a conspiracy is itself
12. An historical account of the development of conspiracy may be found in P. WIN-
FIELD, HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE (1921). See generally
J. BRYAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONSPIRACY (1970) [hereinaf-
ter cited as BRYAN]; 2 1. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRiMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 227-
29 (1883); Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HAav. L. Rv. 393 '(1922); Comment, Rea-
son by Analogy: Agency Principles Justify Conspirators' Liability, 12 STAN. L. REV.
476, 477 n.3 (1960); 3 FLA. B.J 11, 54-58 (1930); 33 TUL. L. REv. 410 (1959).
13. See note 14 infra.
14. Although the criminal action developed rapidly, civil conspiracy, as we know
it today, did not flourish until the effects of the Industrial Revolution began to be
felt in the latter part of the eighteenth century. Industrialization precipitated a
more integrated society in which activity by combinations of persons became a dom-
inant feature.
33 Tu. L. Rav. 410, 411 (1959).
15. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 465 (1920); 15A CJ.S.
Conspiracy § 1(1) (1967); R. PERKINS, CRimrNAL LAw 613 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as PERmINs]; Burdick, Conspiracy as a Crime, and as a Tort, 7 COLum. L. Rev.
229, 231 (1907) [hereinafter cited as Burdick]; 3 FLA. B.J 11, 54 (1930).
16. 15A CJ.S. Conspiracy § 35(1) (1967); see Pinkerton v. United States, 145 F.2d
252, 254 (5th Cir. 1944).
17. See 15A CJ.S. Conspiracy § 43(1) (1967); PERKINs, supra note 15, at 616-17;
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a crime.13 The unlawful combination' 9 is said to be the gist of the
crime2" as the offense will exist regardless of whether the acts agreed
upon are ever in fact committed by the parties to the agreement.2
At common law the acts themselves were considered to be merely evi-
dentiary and were used only to prove the conspiracy.22
The elements required to establish a civil conspiracy are two or more
persons, an unlawful object to be accomplished or a lawful object to
be accomplished by unlawful means, an agreement or meeting of the
minds on the object or course of action, one or more unlawful acts, and
damages proximately caused thereby.23 Unlike a criminal conspiracy,
the existence of a civil conspiracy depends entirely upon the character
of the acts following an unlawful combination. Thus it is almost uni-
12 FoRDHAm L. Rv. 277, 279 n.15 (1943). See also W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, HAND-
BOOK ON C rlmrA.L LAw 476 n.68 (1972) (for a list of those states which have codified
the common law rule that no overt act need be proven).
18. PERKINs, supra note 15, at 613. See generally Iannelli v. United States, 95 S. Ct.
1284 (1975) (for a thorough discussion of the Wharton Rule-whether the crime of con-
spiracy will exist when defendants are charged with a substantive offense which requires
concerted activity as a constituent element of the offense).
19. Since the conspiracy is the combination resulting from the agreement, rather
than the mere agreement itself, it follows that the verb "conspire," when used in
the law, has reference to the formation of the combination. 'To conspire" means
"to combine" and not merely "to agree."
PEgamNs, supra note 15, at 615.
A conspiracy is constituted by an agreement, it is true, but it is the result of the
agreement, rather than the agreement itself, just as a partnership, although consti-
tuted by a contract, is not the contract but is a result of it. The contract is instan-
taneous, the partnership may endure as one and the same partnership for years.
Id. at 608.
20. See 12 FoRDAM L. Rnv. 277, 279 (1943). Burdick refers to the following pas-
sages:
"Such confederation or agreement is itself the offense. The unlawful agreement
makes the crime, and it is complete the moment the agreement is entered into. Its
legal character depends neither upon that which actually follows it nor upon that
which is intended to follow it. It is the same whether its object be accomplished
or abandoned. It may be followed by one overt act, or a series; but, as an offense,
it is complete without them."
Burdick, supra note 15, at 229, quoting State v. Setter, 18 A. 782, 784 (Conn. 1889).
"A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the
agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful
means. So long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not indictable. When
two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself. .. ."
Burdick, supra note 15, at 230, quoting Mulcahy v. The Queen, L.R. 3 H.L. 306 (1868)
(Willes, J.).
21. See note 20 supra.
22. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957); BRYAN, supra note 12, at
85-88.
23. See, e.g., Zelinger v. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co., 316 F.2d 47, 51 (10th Cir. 1963);
Lockwood Grader Corp. v. Bockhaus, 270 P.2d 193, 196 (Colo. 1954); Board of Educ.
v. Hoek, 168 A.2d 829, 835 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1961); 15A CJ.S. Conspiracy § 1(2)
(1967); 33 TuL. L. Rnv. 410, 411 (1959).
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versally accepted that the essence of an action for civil conspiracy is
not the combination but the acts and damage resulting therefrom.24
Consistent with this view is the conclusion that a combination in and
of itself is not a tort. Many of the authorities supporting this general
rule echo the phrase that "a conspiracy cannot be made -the subject of
a civil action unless something is done which, without the conspiracy
(or combination), would have given a right of action."2 6 An exception
is sometimes made to this maxim in cases where several persons com-
bine to commit an act which would incur no liability if committed by
a single individual,2 7 but because the combination results in an aggrega-
24. E.g., Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U.S. 165, 182-83 (1913); James v. Evans, 149 F. 136,
140 (3d Cir. 1906); de Vries v. Brumback, 53 Cal. 2d 643, 649-50, 349 P.2d 532, 536,
2 Cal. Rptr. 764, 768 (1960); Zumbrun v. University of S. Cal., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1,
12, 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 506 (1972); Buchanan v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 206
So. 2d 465, 469 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968), modified on other grounds, 230 So. 2d 9 (Fla.
1969); Miller v. Ortman, 136 N.E.2d 17, 33 (I1. 1956); Coffey v. MacKay, 277 N.E.2d
748, 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972); Cohen v. Bowdoin, 288 A.2d 106, 109-10 (Me. 1972);
Adkison v. Hannah, 475 S.W.2d 39, 44 (Mo. 1972); Cabakov v. Thatcher, 99 A.2d 548,
549-50 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1953); Green v. Davies, 75 N.E. 536, 537 (N.Y. 1905); Worrie
v. Boze, 95 S.E.2d 192, 198 (Va. 1956); Smith v. Christopherson, 64 N.W.2d 744, 747
(Wis. 1954); 3 FLA. B.J. 54 (1930); 12 FoRDHAM L. REv. 277, 279 n.17 (1943); 23
GA. B.J. 548, 549-50 (1961); 10 SYRAcusE L. REv. 166, 167 (1958); 33 TuL. L. REv.
410, 412 (1959); 2 VA-D. L. Rnv. 958, 959 n.2 (1959).
In Browning v. Blair, 218 P.2d 233 (Kan. 1950), the court stated:
The words fraud and conspiracy alone, no matter how often repeated in a plead-
ing, cannot make a case for the interference of a court of equity until connected
with some specific act for which one person is in law responsible to another; they
have no more effect than other words of unpleasant signification.
Id. at 239.
25. Semantic care should be taken in using the words "combination!' and "conspir-
acy" interchangeably when referring to one or the other as a tort. A combination can
never by itself constitute a tort (see note 27 infra), but a conspiracy, if defined to in-
clude, in addition to a combination, both unlawful acts and damages proximately caused
thereby (see note 23 supra and accompanying text defining "civil conspiracy"), may be
labeled a tort though the acts and damages proximately caused thereby must be recog-
nized as the substance of the tort (see notes 24 supra and 28 infra and accompanying
text).
26. E.g., Bixby v. Wilson & Co., 196 F. Supp. 889, 892 (W.D. Iowa 1961); Zumbrun
v. University of S. Cal., 23 Cal. App. 3d 1, 12, 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 506 (1972); Mc-
Kown v. McDonnell, 175 N.E.2d 584, 585 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961); Shannon v. Gaar, 6
N.W.2d 304, 307 (Iowa 1942); Tucker v. Edwards, 38 So. 2d 241, 245 (La. 1948); Lo-
pez v. Swyer, 300 A.2d 563, 568 (N.J. 1973); 12 FORDHAM L. Rnv. 277, 279 (1943).
See generally Ilappas v. Augustis, 47 So. 2d 582, 583 (Fla. 1950); cases collected in
1 T. COOLEY, A TREATrsE ON THE LAw OF ToRTs OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDE-
PENDENTLY OF CONTRACT 234 n.7 (4th ed. 1932) [hereinafter cited as COOLEY].
27. See Cohen v. Lion Prods. Co., 177 F. Supp. 486, 490-91 (D. Mass. 1959); St.
Luke's Hosp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 349 P.2d 995, 1000 (Colo. 1960); Neustadt v. Em-
ployers Liab. Assurance Corp., 21 N.E.2d 538, 540-41 (Mass. 1939); Shaltupsky v.
Brown Shoe Co., 168 S.W.2d 1083, 1086 (Mo. 1943); Pfoh v. Whitney, 62 N.E.2d 744,
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tion of power, which is used in some manner to intimidate, unduly
influence or coerce the plaintiff, liability is imposed.
2 8
755-56 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945) (suggests that definition of term "conspiracy" be limited
to situations where an action is taken by a concert of persons, even though the same
action when taken by an individual would not be actionable); Bliss v. Southern Pac.
Co., 321 P.2d 324, 328 (Ore. 1958).
28. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 150 F. 155, 176 (C.C.E.D.
Wis. 1906); St. Luke's Hosp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 349 P.2d 995, 1000 (Colo. 1960);
Snipes v. West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc., 105 So. 2d 164, 166 (Fla. 1958); Cohen v.
Bowdoin, 288 A.2d 106, 110 n.4 (Me. 1972); Weiner v. Lowenstein, 51 N.E.2d 241,
243 (Mass. 1943); Johnson v. East Boston Say. Bank, 195 N.E. 727, 730 (Mass. 1935);
PROssER, supra note 3, at 293; Charlesworth, Conspiracy as a Ground o1 Liability in
Tort, 36 L.Q. Rnv. 38, 45 (1920); Note, Resulting Confusion from the Varied Develop-
ment of Civil Conspiracy, 23 GA. BJ. 548, 549 (1961); 33 TuL. L. RBv. 410, 412
(1959). See generally Burdick, The Tort of Conspiracy, 8 COLuM. L. REV. 117 (1908);
Burdick, supra note 15.
Under this exception, sometimes referred to as "the force of numbers" exception
(Snipes v. West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc., 105 So. 2d 164, 166 (Fla. 1958); Cohen v.
Bowdoin, 288 A.2d 106, 110 n.4 (Me. 1972); Shaltupsky v. Brown Shoe Co., 168 S.W.2d
1083, 1086 (Mo. 1943); Baucke v. Adams, 188 S.W.2d 355, 366 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945);
15A CJ.S. Conspiracy § 8 (1967); Note, Resulting Confusion from the Varied Devel-
opment of Civil Conspiracy, 23 GA. B.J. 548, 550 (1961); Note, Economic Coercion
Through Force of Numbers as an Actionable Wrong, 12 VAND. L. REV. 958, 960
(1959)), a cause of action is stated as long as the combination of many creates some
peculiar power of coercion, intimidation, or influence that could not have been accom-
plished by separate individuals. See Snipes v. West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc., 105 So.
2d 164 (Fla. 1958); Fleming v. Dane, 22 N.E.2d 609, 611 (Mass. 1939); DesLauries
v. Shea, 13 N.E.2d 932, 935 (Mass. 1938); Willett v. Herrick, 136 N.E. 366, 370 (Mass.
1922). See also Short v. Hotel Riviera, Inc., 378 P.2d 979 (Nev. 1963) (ruling seems
to have been modified by Aldabe v. Adams, 402 P.2d 34, 37 (Nev. 1965)). Conspiracy
is considered to be an independent tort (J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTs 668-75 (2d
ed. 1961); P. JAMES, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw oF TORTS 328-32 (2d ed. 1964))
under this exception and is also referred to as "true conspiracy." See Crofter Hand-
woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch, [1942] A.C. 435 (Scot.); 33 TUL. L. REv. 410, 412
(1959).
The rationale for this exception seems to be that, since the action is unlawful only
when a combination occurs, the gist of the action must be the combination. However,
it would be fallacious for one to conclude that in these cases the combination itself is
a tort and that no acts other than the combination need be alleged in order to state a
cause of action. Such a conclusion is obviously untenable as it ignores a fundamental
axiom of tort law-that an action in tort can only be maintained by one who has been
damaged. PRossER, supra note 3, at 7. A bare agreement among two or more persons
to harm a third person cannot injure the latter unless and until acts are actually per-
formed pursuant to the agreement. Therefore, it is the acts done and not the conspiracy
to do them which should be regarded as the essence of the civil action. BRYAN, supra
note 12, at 38.
Boycott cases and those cases where refusals to deal or to do business are unlawfully
implemented against a plaintiff are the most likely candidates for illustration by those
who maintain that a mere combination may, by itself, constitute a tort, since no "acts"
are needed to cause damage to the plaintiff. It is suggested that, even though no affirm-
ative conduct is taken in such cases, negative conduct separate and apart from any agree-
ment or meeting of the minds is necessarily taken in the form of an implementation
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B. The Purpose of Alleging Civil Conspiracy
The principles which govern the substantive civil wrong committed
by one or more of the co-conspirators are the same whether the sub-
of the mutual understanding, i.e., the actors not only must agree on a proposed boycott
or refusal to deal, but also must execute this agreement by undertaking to discontinue
or terminate that which otherwise would have occurred. Such a distinction is made in
the dissenting opinion of Justice Roberts in Snipes v. West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc.,
105 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1958):
Thus, the allegation that the other dog tracks in this state have become "unwilling
partners in the boycott and conspiracy directed against the plaintiff," if such a
vague generalization can mean anything, [it] can mean only that the other dog
tracks have agreed not to book plaintiff's dogs at their tracks-not that they have
actually refused to do so.
Id. at 169.
Nevertheless, in addition to the indispensability of acts and resulting damage in all
cases of civil conspiracy, there are those cases in which a cause of action would not
be available without a combination (see cases cited supra). In our competitive society,
combinations of persons may be necessary to generate coercive power in certain contexts
merely because of the inability of persons individually to employ sufficient economic re-
sources toward such a goal. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).) It is submitted that
if one person did have the power usually only exercised by many, his acts would cause
the identical damage and would likewise be as unlawful as the exercise of that same
power by many. Thus in those cases where a cause of action would not, under certain
factual circumstances, lie for the mere acts of individuals, it does not therefore follow
that a cause of action could not under those circumstances lie if the acts were done only
by one person possessing the necessary economic power.
Thus one can see the true role of the combination in the "force of numbers" cases,
not as a tortious act itself, but rather as a method of pooling economic power. For if
it is possible that the same power could be exercised under similar circumstances by a
single person to cause the same harm, the tort exists not because of the manner in which
the power is acquired, but rather because of the use to which that economic power is
put, either by one individual or by several acting in concert. But see cases cited in
Short v. Hotel Riviera, Inc., 378 P.2d 979, 985-86 (Nev. 1963); 15A CJ.S. Con-
spiracy § 8, at 611 n.38 (1967).
After closely examining the "force of numbers" exception, it becomes apparent that
it was conceived out of necessity to rectify the result of a misleading maxim (see text
accompanying note 26 supra). One can only surmise that courts, in their zeal to illus-
trate the difference between civil and criminal conspiracy, have seized upon what has
turned out to be an unfortunate basis for a distinction. Mindful that the crime of crim-
inal conspiracy is based solely upon the unlawful combination of two or more persons,
without regard to any other acts which may occur in consequence thereof, the courts
sought to distinguish criminal conspiracy from civil conspiracy by formulating the often
quoted phrase that a conspiracy cannot be made the subject of a civil action unless some-
thing is done which, without the conspiracy or combination, would have given a right
of action. This maxim is workable in most cases and provides a direct contrast between
criminal and civil conspiracy. Where a criminal conspiracy requires a combination be-
fore an offense will exist, by contrast, a civil conspiracy will only be actionable if the
combination is not a necessary element and if the wrong will exist without it.
In the majority of cases this maxim works well as most injuries can be inflicted by
a person acting alone. But in some cases where a pooling of economic power or other
interests under certain circumstances is necessary to effect an unlawful result not capable
of being caused by one individual under those same circumstances, this maxim, when
310 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
stantive wrong is claimed to have originated in a conspiracy or to have
been committed individually without the aid of another. 29  Thus it is
said that the major significance of referring to concerted action as a con-
spiracy lies in the fact that it renders each participant in the wrongful
act jointly responsible for all damages ensuing from the wrong,
regardless of whether or not he was an actual participant and re-
gardless of the degree of his participation.3 0  By pleading conspiracy,
the plaintiff implicates each defendant who merely participates in the
common design. The -act or declarations1 of one defendant in carrying
out the wrong is the act or declaration of all, and thus persons who
merely agree to the plan or design may be held liable for the acts of
others even if they in fact commit no overt act and gain no benefit
thus applied, leads one to conclude that a cause of action for civil conspiracy cannot
exist.
This result left the courts with no choice but to fashion the "force of numbers" excep-
tion. It is submitted that the latter group of cases does not illustrate a different form
of civil conspiracy deserving the titles of either "force of numbers" or "true conspiracy,"
but these undeserved titles have been bestowed by the courts in an effort to establish
congruity in the law while unwittingly applying a maxim which, on analysis, has proven
to be erroneous. The difficulty with this maxim is that its sweep is too broad. Instead
of demonstrating the difference between criminal and civil conspiracy by stating that the
wrong underlying an action for civil conspiracy is never based solely upon a combina-
tion, contrary to cases of criminal conspiracy, the courts have suggested by this maxim
that the wrong underlying an action for civil conspiracy can never be based upon a com-
bination.
Thus the flaw to be found in this maxim lies in its exaggeration. The wrong underly-
ing an action for civil conspiracy may or may not require a combination for its existence,
but in all cases there must be something beyond this combination before a civil injury
occurs-there must be a tortious act done pursuant to the combination which causes in-
jury to the plaintiff. Only these required acts done pursuant to the combination distin-
guish criminal conspiracy from civil conspiracy.
29. 12 FOReDHAM L. REv. 277, 280 (1943).
30. See Mox, Inc. v. Woods, 202 Cal. 675, 677-78, 262 P. 302, 303 (1927); Wise
v. Southern Pac. Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 64, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652, 660 (1963); Miller
v. John, 70 N.E. 27, 29 (Ill. 1904); Cohen v. Nathaniel Fisher & Co., 120 N.Y.S. 546,
547 (App. Div. 1909); White v. White, 111 N.W. 1116, 1119 (Wis. 1907); 12 FORDHAM
L. REv. 277, 280 (1943).
31. One advantage that may be gained by a charge of civil conspiracy is the eviden-
tiary consequences. See Burton v. Dixon, 131 S.E.2d 27, 30 (N.C. 1963); Singer v.
Singer, 14 N.W.2d 43, 46 (Wis. 1944). Under the co-conspirators exception to the
hearsay rule, the declarations of one conspirator made while participating in a conspir-
acy to commit a civil wrong, in furtherance of the objectives of that conspiracy and be-
fore or during the time that a co-conspirator was participating in the conspiracy, will be
admissible against the co-conspirator. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74
(1941); B.R. Paulsen & Co. v. Lee, 237 N.E.2d 793, 796 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Loewin-
than v. Beth David Hosp., 9 N.Y.S.2d 367, 373 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Shope v. Boyer, 150
S.E.2d 771, 774 (N.C. 1966); Hashimoto v. Halm, 40 Hawaii 354, 363-64 (1953); FED.
R. EviD. 801(d) (2)(E); CAL. Evm. CODE § 1223 (West 1966).
19751 CIVIL CONSPIRACY
therefrom.2 Everyone who enters into such a common design is le-
gally a party to every act previously or subsequently done by any of the
others pursuant to the design.33
Therefore, except for those cases where a combination is said to be
a necessary part of the action,34 allegations of civil conspiracy function
merely as a means of according to the injured plaintiff a remedy against
parties not otherwise legally responsible for the wrong. If at trial a
conspiracy cannot be proven because the evidence connects only one
person with the wrong actually committed, the plaintiff may neverthe-
less recover against him as if he alone had been sued.3 6 A charge of
32. See Mox, Inc. v. Woods, 202 Cal. 675, 678, 262 P. 302, 303 (1927); Jackson
v. Scott County Milling Co., 118 S.W.2d 1054, 1057 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938); Trebelhom
v. Bartlett, 47 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Neb. 1951). In Western Md. Dairy, Inc. v. Cheno-
with, 23 A.2d 660 (Md. Ct. App. 1942), the court noted:
When individuals associate themselves together in an unlawful enterprise, any act
done by one of the conspirators is in legal contemplation the act of all. The mind
of each being intent upon a common object, and the energy of each being enlisted
in a common purpose, each is the agent of all the others, and the acts done and
words spoken during the existence of the enterprise are consequently the acts and
words of all.
Id. at 664.
The court in Green v. Cochran, 43 Iowa 544 (1876), provided similar analysis:
A number of persons may conspire to do an unlawful act, and each becomes respon-
sible for acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy. It would be no defense to any
one of them to show that his participation was not necessary to the accomplishment
of the ultimate purpose, and that it would have been consummated if he had not
become a conspirator.
Id. at 550; see Brumley v. Chattanooga Speedway & Motordome Co., 198 S.W. 775
(Tenn. 1917); 1 CooLEY, supra note 26, at 236.
33. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967), citing Nassof v. United
States, 370 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1966); Calcutt v. Gerig, 271 F. 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1921);
Riss & Co. v. Association of Am. R.Rs., 170 F. Supp. 354, 371 (D.D.C. 1959); de Vries
v. Brumback, 53 Cal. 2d 643, 648, 349 P.2d 532, 535, 2 Cal. Rptr. 764, 767 (1960);
Western Homes, Inc. v. District Court, 296 P.2d 460, 464 (Colo. 1956); Peoples Loan
Co. v. Allen, 34 S.E.2d 811, 824 (Ga. 1945); Reiter v. Illinois Natl Cas. Co., 65 N.E.2d
830, 841 (Ill. App. Ct. 1946); Baker v. State Bank, 44 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Ind. App. Ct.
1942).
While the parties to a conspiracy are responsible for acts growing out of the general
design, they are not responsible for independent acts growing out of the particular malice
of individuals. Pyles v. Armstrong, 275 P. 753, 756 (Mont. 1929). Conspirators are
not held liable for the acts of their fellow conspirators, committed unbeknownst to the
rest, "beyond the reasonable intendment of the common understanding." Taxin v. Food
Fair Stores, Inc., 287 F.2d 448, 451 (3d Cir. 1961); Momand v. Universal Film Exch.,
72 F. Supp. 469, 475 (D. Mass. 1947), a! 'd, 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948).
34. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
35. Keefe v. Derounian, 6 F.R.D. 11, 12 (N.D. Ill. 1946); Widdows v. Koch, 263
Cal. App. 2d 228, 234, 69 Cal. Rptr. 464, 467 (1968); cf. B.R. Paulsen & Co. v. Lee,
237 N.E.2d 793, 796 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6, 12-13 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1971); Shope v. Boyer, 150 S.E.2d 771, 774 (N.C. 1966).
36. Trebelhorn v. Bartlett, 47 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Neb. 1951); 1 CoOLEY, supra note
26, at 237-38.
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civil conspiracy is simply a procedural method of joining defendants so
that, subject to proof37 of the necessary allegations,8 8 a plaintiff's
chances of recovery are increased.89
MI-. CIVIL CONSPIRACY APPLIED TO INTERFERENCE
WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
A. Conspiracy to Interfere-Conspiracy to Breach
Inasmuch as civil conspiracy is a procedural concept characterizing
the manner in which substantive wrongs are perpetrated, it is manifest
that a civil conspiracy may seek as its object not only the commission
of a tort, but also the breach of a contract.
The concept of civil conspiracy has been applied in numerous cases
involving disrupted business relationships.4 ° One distinction which has
been given little more than token recognition by the case law41 is the
37. As an evidentiary matter, since conspiracy is usually conceived and executed in
secret, courts allow the conspiracy to be established by circumstantial evidence, ordinar-
ily consisting of the disconnected acts of the conspirators which, when taken in connec-
tion with each other, tend to show a combination to secure a particular result. See 12
FoRDHAM L. Rnv. 277, 280 (1943).
Conspirators do not voluntarily proclaim their purposes; their methods are clandes-
tine. It is sufficient if the proven facts and circumstances, pieced together and con-
sidered as a whole, convince the Court that the parties were acting together under-
standingly in order to accomplish the fraudulent scheme. Thus a conspiracy may
be established by inference from the nature of the acts complained of, the individual
and collective interest of the alleged conspirators, the situation and relation of the
parties at the time of the commission of the acts, the motives which produced them,
and all the surrounding circumstances preceding and attending the culmination of
the common design.
Western Md. Dairy, Inc. v. Chenowith, 23 A.2d 660, 664 (Md. Ct. App. 1942); see
Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 64, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652, 660 (1963);
Schaefer v. Berinstein, 140 Cal. App. 2d 278, 293, 295 P.2d 113, 123 (1956).
38. In California, the courts have held that to state a cause of action for conspiracy,
the complaint must allege: (1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy; (2) tho
wrongful act or acts done pursuant thereto; and (3) the damage resulting from such act
or acts. See Orloff v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 17 Cal. 2d 484, 488, 110 P.2d 396, 398
(1941); Mox, Inc. v. Woods, 202 Cal. 675, 677, 262 P. 302, 303 (1927); Wise v. South-
ern Pac. Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 64, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652, 660 (1963); James v. Herbert,
149 Cal. App. 2d 741, 746, 309 P.2d 91, 94 (1957); Schaefer v. Berinstein, 140 Cal.
App. 2d 278, 293, 295 P.2d 113, 123 (1956); California Auto Court Ass'n v. Cohn,
98 Cal. App. 2d 145, 149, 219 P.2d 511, 514 (1950).
39. Cf. Trebelhorn v. Bartlett, 47 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Neb. 1951); Board of Educ. v.
Hoek, 168 A.2d 829, 835 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1961); State ex rel. Myers v. Wood, 175 S.E.
2d 637, 645 (W. Va. 1970); 1 COOLEY, supra note 26, at 236; 12 FORDHAM L. R(v.
277, 280 (1943).
40. See cases collected in notes 47 & 49 infra. 6ee generally 15A CJ.S. Conspiracy
§§ 13-15 (1967).
41. See cases cited in notes 47 & 49 infra. New York case law seems to make a dis-
tinction between conspiracy to interfere and conspiracy to breach with the recitation that
"a party to a contract cannot conspire to breach or induce the breach of his own con-
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difference between conspiracy to interfere with and conspiracy to
breach a contractual relationship. This unfortunate oversight has re-
sulted in a split of authority in the law which will be developed below.
For the most part, applying the principles of civil conspiracy to join
as defendants co-conspirators, none of whom are parties to the relation-
ship interfered with, presents little difficulty. The wrong complained
of is the tort of interference with contractual relations on the part of
all of the co-conspirators. If all of these co-conspirators are strangers
to or have no direct 2 interest in the contractual relationship, then they
may be joined together as defendants conspiring to interfere and may
be held liable jointly and severally for damages.
43
The controversy arises when a party44 to the relationship interfered
tract." Canister v. National Can Corp., 96 F. Supp. 273, 274 (D. Del. 1951) (applying
New York law); Cuker Indus., Inc. v. William L. Crow Constr. Co., 178 N.Y.S.2d 777,
778 (App. Div. 1958); Sax v. Sommers, 108 N.Y.S.2d 467, 468 (Sup. Ct. 1951). This
distinction, however, is not well developed. Moreover, the New York courts have appar-
ently chosen to blur any distinction between conspiracy to interfere and conspiracy to
breach with their interchangeable use of the two terms. This loose treatment of these
terms is reflected in those cases where the courts have concluded that a charge of con-
spiracy to breach may result in tort liability. See Savarin Corp. v. National Bank of
Pakistan, 290 F. Supp. 285, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Sax v. Sommers, 108 N.Y.S.2d 467,
468 (Sup. Ct. 1951); note 65 infra. Such a conclusion presumably stems from the falla-
cious belief that civil conspiracy is solely a tort concept, ignoring its primary function
as a method of charging one or more defendants with the acts or declarations of another
regardless of whether or not those acts or declarations involve a tort or a breach of con-
tract.
42. Although many persons may not be regarded as strangers to a relationship in the
sense that they have an indirect interest in the outcome (e.g., shareholders of a corpora-
tion would have an indirect interest in any relationships, contractual or otherwise, be-
tween their corporation and third parties), this indirect interest must be distinguished
from the direct interest held by one who is, for example, a party to a contractual rela-
tionship or who is negotiating with the expectation of becoming a party to a contract.
43. There is little agreement on what measure of damages should be applied to the
tort of interference with contractual relations.
Where substantial loss has occurred, one line of cases tends to adopt the contract
measure of damages, limiting recovery to those damages which were within the con-
templation of the parties when the original contract was made. Another, appar-
ently somewhat more uncertain of its ground, has applied a tort measure, but has
limited the damages to those which are sufficiently "proximate," with some analogy
to the rules as to negligent torts. A third, perhaps the most numerous, has treated
the tort as an intentional one, and has allowed recovery for unforeseen expenses,
as well as for mental suffering, damage to reputation, and punitive damages, by
analogy to the cases of intentional injury to person or property.
PROSSER, supra note 3, at 948-49 (footnotes omitted); see Comment, Plaintiff's Measure
of Recovery for Tortious Inducement of Breach of Contract-Profits or Losses, 19
HAsTNGs L.J. 1119 (1968); Note, Interference with Contractual Relations: A Common
Measure of Damages, 7 SAWTA CLARA LAW. 140 (1966) thereinafter cited as Interfer-
ence]; 30 CoLUm. L. Ray. 232 (1930).
44. For purposes of this Comment, both one who is a party to a contractual relation-
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with is joined as a co-conspirator and a victim attempts to impose tort
liability upon him along with other non-party interferers on a theory
of conspiracy to interfere. It is in this context that the distinction be-
tween conspiracy to interfere and conspiracy to breach is overlooked,
and the American cases bifurcate into distinct and directly opposed
lines of authority. The cases expressing these conflicting views involve
almost exclusively the tort of interference with contractual relations
and, primarily, the more specific tort of inducing breach of contract."
The New York view"' is that a party to a contract cannot be 'held
liable for conspiring to interfere with his own contract. 47  In contrast,
the California view48 holds that a contracting party may be held liable
ship and one who is negotiating with the expectation of becoming a party to a contrac-
tual relationship will be referred to as a "party." See note 42 supra.
45. Interference with contractual relations and inducing breach of contract are sep-
arate and distinct actions. Interference is broader; it compensates for damages re-
sulting from the defendant's actions affecting the subject matter of the contract, and
does not require proof that there has been a breach of contract.
Interference, supra note 43, at 140 n.l.
46. The term "New York view" has been utilized because of the relative abundance
of New York authority on this question. See note 47 infra.
47. Some of the cases expressing this view are Alghanim v. Boeing Co., 477 F.2d 143,
149-50 (9th Cir. 1973); Sewell v. I.E. Crosbie, Inc., 127 F.2d 599, 602 (8th Cir. 1942)
(Woodborough, J., dissenting); Ariate Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Commonwealth Tank-
ship Owners, Ltd., 310 F. Supp. 416, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Nolan v. Williamson Music,
Inc., 300 F. Supp. 1311, 1320 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Potter's Photographic Applications Co.
v. Ealing Corp., 292 F. Supp. 92, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Savarin Corp. v. National Bank
of Pakistan, 290 F. Supp. 285, 291-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Griebel v. J.I. Case Credit
Corp., 285 F. Supp. 621, 624 (D. Minn. 1968); Harris v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y
of United States, 147 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Iowa 1957); Allison v. American Airlines, Inc.,
112 F. Supp. 37, 39 (N.D. Okla. 1953); Canister Co. v. National Can Corp., 96 F. Supp.
273, 274 (D. Del. 1951); Worrick v. Flora, 272 N.E.2d 708, 711 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971);
Bartsas Realty, Inc. v. Nash, 402 P.2d 650, 651 (Nev. 1965); Flaster v. Lincoln Tide-
water Terminals, 10 A.2d 730, 731-32 (N.J. Ct. App. 1940); Bereswill v. Yablon, 160
N.E.2d 531, 533, 189 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (1959); Miller v. Vanderlip, 33 N.E.2d 51, 56
(N.Y. 1941) (Lehman, I., dissenting); Hornstein v. Podwitz, 173 N.E. 674 (N.Y. 1930)
(by implication); Turntables, Inc. v. M.B. Plastics Corp., 297 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52-53 (App.
Div. 1969); Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Simon, 251 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71 (App. Div.
1964), affd mem., 205 N.E.2d 869, 257 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1965); Caprice Imports, Inc.
v. Soc. Acc. Semplice Calzaturificio Vibelsport & Co., 216 N.Y.S.2d 498, 499-500 (App.
Div. 1961); Cuker Indus., Inc. v. William L. Crow Constr. Co., 178 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779
(App. Div. 1958); Andrews v. Lebis, 105 N.Y.S.2d 325, 331 (App. Div. 1951); Quinlan
v. Consolidated Edison Co., 237 N.Y.S.2d 745, 748 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (dictum); Piranesi
Imports, Inc. v. Laverne, 233 N.Y.S.2d 659, 661 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Boro Motors Corp. v.
Century Motor Sales Corp., 187 N.Y.S.2d 490, 493 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Sax v. Sommers,
108 N.Y.S.2d 467, 468-69 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Dumas v. Kalozois, 94 N.Y.S.2d 749, 751
(Sup. Ct. 1949); Schell v. Kaiser-Frazer Sales Corp., 274 N.E.2d 315, 318-19 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1971) (dicta); Hein v. Chrysler Corp., 277 P.2d 708, 715 (Wash. 1954). See
generally 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 13 (1967); PROSSER, supra note 3, at 934.
48. The term "California view" has been utilized because the decision which most
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in tort for conspiring to interfere with his own contractual relations.49
The rationale which is used to support the New York view takes the
form of one or more of the following arguments: first, "since plaintiff's
damages can be recovered in an action for breach of contract, the con-
tract action constitutes plaintiff's entire grievance";50 second, a plaintiff
may not recover extra-contractual damages in a breach of contract ac-
tion;51 third, a party to a contract is unable to interfere with or to induce
the breach of his own contract.52 The cases expressing the California
view rely on the following arguments: first, it is just as wrong for
a party to a contract to enlist the aid of third persons in effecting a
breach of contract as is the act of a third party in interfering with or
inducing the breach of another's contract;53 and, second, to hold all of
the conspirators liable in tort "is in harmony with sound morals."5
Inasmuch as the above perfunotory arguments provide little analysis
of either the California or New York view, the remainder of this Com-
ment will attempt to suggest insights into the rationale underlying these
two divergent views which will be dispositive of this controverted issue.
thoroughly discusses this issue is a California case, Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., 223
Cal. App. 2d 50, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1963), and because the geographic locations of Cal-
ifornia and New York appropriately represent the polarity of opinion on this issue.
49. See Motley, Green & Co. v. Detroit Steel & Spring Co., 161 F. 389 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1908); Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 65-72, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652, 660-
65 (1963); National Linen Serv. Corp. v. Clower, 175 S.E. 460, 466 (Ga. 1934); Luke
v. Du Pree, 124 S.E. 13, 16-17 (Ga. 1924); Blivas & Page, Inc. v. Klein, 282 N.E.2d
210, 214 (IlM. App. Ct. 1972); Edison Realty Co. v. Bauernschub, 62 A.2d 354, 358
(Md. Ct. App. 1948); Western Md. Dairy, Inc. v. Chenowith, 23 A.2d 660, 664 (Md.
Ct. App. 1942); Spring Co. v. Holle, 78 N.W.2d 315, 317 (Minn. 1956) (trial court
found interference by all defendants but limited recovery to contract damages); Sorenson
v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 214 N.W. 754, 755-56 (Minn. 1927) (Stone, J., dissenting);
Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Byers Bros. Real Estate & Ins.
Agency, Inc. v. Campbell, 329 S.W.2d 393, 396-97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (dictum); Wor-
ie v. Boze, 95 S.E.2d 192, 198-99 (Va. 1956), affd on rehearing, 96 S.E.2d 799 (1957);
cf. Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Iowa Fruit & Produce Co., 112 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1940).
50. Savarin Corp. v. National Bank of Pakistan, 290 F. Supp. 285, 291 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Flaster v. Lincoln Tidewater Terminals, 10 A.2d 730, 731 (NJ. 1940); cf. Bar-
ber v. Stephenson, 69 So. 2d 251, 255 (Ala. 1953).
51. Canister v. National Can Corp., 96 F. Supp. 273, 274 (D. Del. 1951). See also
Potter's Photographic Applications Co. v. Ealing Corp., 292 F. Supp. 92, 105 (E.D.N.Y.
1968); Savarin Corp. v. National Bank of Pakistan, 290 F. Supp. 285, 291 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
52. Allison v. American Airlines, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 37, 38 (N.D. Okla. 1953); Hein
v. Chrysler Corp., 277 P.2d 708, 715 (Wash. 1954).
53. Motley, Green & Co. v. Detroit Steel & Spring Co., 161 F. 389, 397 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1908); accord, Worrie v. Boze, 95 S.E.2d 192, 199 (Va. 1956), aff'd on rehearing,
96 S.E.2d 799 (1957).
54. Luke v. Du Pree, 124 S.E. 13, 17 (Ga. 1924); see Wise v. Southern Pac. Co.,
223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 72, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652, 665 (1963).
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B. Can One Interfere or Conspire to Interfere with a
Relationship to Which One is a Party?
The tort of interference with contractual relationships contemplates
intentional conduct on the part of persons who can be appropriately la-
belled as interferers or outsiders, i.e., those who by intermeddling take
part in the concerns of others 5 It is difficult to understand how a
party to a contractual relationship could ever be labelled as an outsider
or as one who could conspire to interfere with such a relationship. In
numerous cases involving the tort of interference with contractual rela-
tionships there are examples of non-party defendants who are charged
with interference but who are not found liable because of some justifi-
able interest held in the disrupted relationship." However, a party to
a contractual relationship not only has an interest in that relationship,
but his interest is the sine qua non thereof. His acts with respect to
the relationship can never be considered an interference because they
are the essential and operative ingredients which determine its constitu-
tion and viability or, conversely, which cause its breach or deterioration.
In the recent case of Blivas & Page, Inc. v. Klein,57 an Illinois court,
although admitting that a party cannot interfere with his own contract,
held that a party can nevertheless conspire to interfere with his own
contract.55 The logic behind this latter contention appears to be that
an actor can be held liable for the consequences of an act on a theory
of conspiracy even though he does not or cannot commit the act alone.
In general, this logic is sound and represents the major advantage to
55. See WEBSTR's Tnhm Nnw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1178 (1964) ("inter-
ference"). See also Bruce Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 325
F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1963).
56. See Culcal Stylco, Inc. v. Vornado, Inc., 26 Cal. App. 3d 879, 882, 103 Cal. Rptr.
419, 421 (1972) (financial interest); Cal-Medicon v. Los Angeles County Medical
Ass'n, 20 Cal. App. 3d 148, 152, 97 Cal. Rptr. 530, 533 (1971) (special relationship);
Gunter v. Cooper, 154 Cal. App. 2d 862, 871, 317 P.2d 94, 100 (1957) (health, safety
and morals); Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations, 41 HARV. L. REV. 728,
745-62 (1928). See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 766-74 (1939); 24 CALIF. L. REV.
208 (1936).
57. 282 N.E.2d 210 (Ii. App. Ct. 1972).
58. Id. at 214. Blivas and Page, Inc. was an architectural firm that had been involved
with several successful FHA projects. They were recommended to the developer
on the project in question but that developer was not approved by the FHA. Blivas
and Page were still desirous of continuing with the project so they solicited Klein, a for-
mer client, to serve as the sponsor. Id. at 212. Klein promised that if he were approved
by the FHA, he would retain Blivas and Page as the architects for the project. Klein
then brought in additional sponsors, including Kay. Kay acquired a large interest and




a plaintiff in referring -to concerted action as conspiracy.59 However,
in approaching the question of whether or not it is possible for a party
to a relationship to conspire to interfere with the relationship, one must
examine that party's motivations, for to be liable as a conspirator one
must have participated intentionally in the conspiracy with a view to-
ward fulfilling the common design. 0
A common factual pattern6 may be useful for purposes of analysis:
A and B are parties to a contract. C induces A to breach his contract
in order that A will be free to do business with C. B brings suit against
both A and C for conspiring to interfere with his contractual relations
with A.
In this illustration, A assumes the passive role of tho one being per-
suaded -to breach his contract. Under the California view, A may be
held liable with C for conspiring to interfere, and both will be subject
to liability in tort damages. But can it realistically be said that A par-
ticipated with C for -the purpose of causing an interference? It appears
that in the above illustration the only act of interference was caused
through the conduct of C, which was completed before A participated
in any manner in the common design. Thus the tort of interference
preceded any participation by A. Even if we assume that A formally
agreed with C to breach his contract, this formation of intent would
have taken place in the aftermath of the interference. It must be kept
in mind that if A had decided to breach his contract at a time before
C attempted to induce the breach thereof, Cs conduct would not be
the cause in fact for B's damages and would, therefore, not be
tortious.63
59. See notes 30 & 32 supra and accompanying text.
60. Holder v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 267 Cal. App. 2d 91, 108, 72 Cal. Rptr. 704,
715 (1968); James v. Herbert, 149 Cal. App. 2d 741, 747, 309 P.2d 91, 94-95 (1957);
Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp., 435 S.W.2d 854, 857
(Tex. 1968).
61. See generally Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 214 N.W. 754 (Minn. 1927); R-
STATEMENT oF TORTS § 766 (1939).
62. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766 (1939). When a party to a contract takes
an active role in soliciting or inviting one, not a party to that relationship (an outsider),
to enter into a relationship with him, there may be some question as to whether or not
the agreement of the outsider to enter into relations with the party constitutes an inter-
ference. Even assuming that the outsider is aware of the existing relationship, if the
party had already determined that it would breach its contract or otherwise terminate
its relations before it solicited the outsider, then it will be difficult to demonstrate that
any acts of the outsider did in fact cause the breach or termination of relations. As
Professor Prosser has stated:
In order to be held liable for interference with a contract, the defendant must
be shown to have caused the interference. It is not enough that he merely has
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One might further ask what goal were A and C acting concertedly
to accomplish? Subsequent to C's interference, A -and C formed the
mutual design and understanding that A would breach his contract and
that A and C would thereafter enter into a relationship. Thus the con-
spiracy in this case, and in most cases where a party to the relationship
is involved, is to breach .the contract and not a conspiracy to interfere
with the contract. C's conduct, although performed pursuant to a con-
reaped the advantages of the broken contract after the contracting party has with-
drawn from it of his own motion.
PROSSER, supra note 3, at 934 (footnotes omitted).
An extreme example of active conduct on the part of the party to a contract may
be found in United States v. Newbury Mfg. Co., 36 F. Supp. 602 (D. Mass. 1941), in
which the plaintiff alleged that a corporation (Newbury) entered into a contract with
the United States to purchase merchandise from it and further agreed to dispose of this
merchandise exclusively to foreign countries. Allegedly those persons who owned and
controlled Newbury subsequently organized Belmont corporation, a shell to whom New-
bury sold the merchandise in violation of the terms of the agreement. Plaintiff's suit
charged Belmont with interference with contractual relations. The court commented on
the necessity that the party be willing and able to perform but for the interference:
The rule [that one who persuades another to break a contract will be held liable
in tort] presupposes that the party defaulting was ready, able and willing to perform
and would have done so if it had not been prevented or persuaded by the malicious
and unwarranted interference of a third party.
Id. at 605. The court thus concluded that plaintiff's complaint failed to state a cause
of action against Belmont corporation since Belmont did not persuade Newbury to
forgo performance or otherwise render Newbury unable to perform. Rather, the court
found Belmont to be an instrumentality of Newbury.
A good discussion of a case of active conduct on the part of a party to a contract
in soliciting others to assist in the breach of that contract may be found in Motley,
Green & Co. v. Detroit Steel & Spring Co., 161 F. 389 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908). The court
cites an example of an employer of an actor who was desirous of driving the actor out
of his employment. The employer invited several third parties to attend his theatre to
hoot and hiss at the actor. This conduct by the third parties interrupted plaintiff and
prevented him from exercising his profession, causing him to lose engagements and to
be brought into public scandal and disgrace. Id. at 397-98.
The court concluded that an action in tort for interference could be maintained against
the employer as well as the third parties in that situation. However, it is suggested that
the third parties who hissed and hooted neither caused the employer to terminate his
relationship with plaintiff nor induced him to harass the plaintiff, those decisions having
been made before their participation or involvement. Thus these third parties should not
have been charged with interference with contractual relations and should have been
classified as the agents of the employer, assisting the latter in causing a termination of
the contract. Such conduct, however, far surpasses what may be termed a mere breach
on the part of the contracting party (employer) who could have merely fired the plain-
tiff if his sole objective were to breach his contract. The employer and his third party
agents, therefore, may be held liable jointly not only for contractual damages for con-
spiring to breach the contract, but also for whatever damages in tort may have been oc-
casioned by the hissing and hooting. It should be emphasized, however, that for the rea-
sons stated above, this conduct exceeding a mere breach of contract, if at all tortious,
cannot be classified as interference with contractual relations. Liability for conduct ex-
ceeding a mere breach is discussed at notes 102-17 infra and accompanying text.
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spiracy to breach, also amounts to an interference. Although C could
be held liable jointly with A for contraot damages on a theory of con-
spiracy to breach, 63 a plaintiff will most likely opt to seek the greater
recovery of tort damages for the interference.64
The opinions do not develop a meaningful distinction between con-
spiracy to breach and conspiracy to interfere. 65 Thus many courts, be-
cause they consider the concepts one and the same, erroneously em-
brace the view that a party to a contract can conspire -to interfere with
his own contract. This position fails to recognize that the breaching
party alone could never be an interferer and that -the breaching party
participating in concert does not intend to accomplish any goal other
than the breach of his contract.
66
63. See note 65 infra.
64. See notes 69, 73-74 infra and accompanying text.
65. As indicated in note 41 supra, New York case law has apparently blurred the dis-
tinction between conspiracy to breach and conspiracy to interfere with the result that
it maintains the peculiar view, not necessarily shared by other courts embracing the
"New York view," that not only can a party to a contract not conspire to interfere with
such a contract, but a party to a contract cannot conspire to breach his contract. Simi-
larly, cases adopting the "California view" also blur the distinction between conspiracy
to interfere and conspiracy to breach, see Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d
50, 63, 71, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652, 659, 664-65 (1963); Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6, 13-14
(Mo. Ct. App. 1971), with the contrary finding that a party to a contract can not only
conspire to breach his contract, but also can conspire to interfere with his contract.
Logically there is no reason why a party to a contract cannot be held liable for conspir-
ing to breach his contract, since civil conspiracy functions primarily as an adjective de-
scribing the concerted nature of independent acts which are unlawful whether the acts
amount to tortious conduct or a breach of contract.
66. See Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1963);
Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6, 13-14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971). What might be termed
an "exception" to the New York view arises in those cases where there are three or more
independent parties to a contract. Illustrations are necessary:
1. A, B, and C are all parties to a contract. A induces B to breach the contract
causing C damages. C brings suit against A and B for conspiring to interfere.
2. A, B, and C are all parties to a contract. A and B, by mutual persuasion,
come to the agreement that they will both breach their contract with C. They both
breach causing C damages. C brings suit against A and B for conspiring to inter-
fere.
In Illustration 1 above, although A is a party to the contract, he has assumed the role
of an interferer in B's relations with C and in Illustration 2 above, although both A and
B are parties to their contracts, they are acting not only with an intent to cause a breach
of their contracts, but each is assuming the role of an interferer-each having interfered
with the other's relationship with C. This exception was recognized in the New York
case of Kay v. Sussel, 199 N.Y.S.2d 180 (Sup. Ct. 1960). Kay alleged that he and Per-
coco were, by contract, managers for Coby, a singer, and that Percoco successfully con-
spired with Sussel to induce Coby to breach that contract. Defendant Percoco argued
that since he was a party to the contract breached, he could not be sued for inducing
breach of contract. The court denied Percoco's motion to dismiss, distinguishing this
case from the cases representing the New York view. Offering a somewhat unclear ra-
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C. Are Tort Damages Recoverable for a Mere Breach of Contract?
The fundamental distinction between the New York and California
views lies in their diverse remedial consequences. The courts have
stated three different measures of damages for the tort of interference
with contractual relations: one, the damages recoverable in a tort ac-
tionale, the court noted that in most cases where a party to a contract has been sued
for conspiring to induce its breach, a cause of action is also stated for the breach itself,
and that in such cases a plaintiff is made whole by recovery on the contract cause of
action. The implication, therefore, was that plaintiff cannot recover on a tort theory
of interference from the breaching party. The court distinguished this situation by
pointing out that Percoco did not breach any contract, implying that plaintiff's only re-
covery against Percoco would have to be in tort.
The Kay decision seems to base its rationale on the argument that when one sues a
contracting party who has breached his contract, he may not recover in tort from the
breaching party for conspiring to induce the breach since the plaintiff's damages can be
recovered in an action for breach of contract-these latter damages constituting his en-
tire grievance. See note 50 supra and accompanying text. It is submitted that this "argu-
ment" avoids the question why contractual damages should constitute the plaintiff's en-
tire grievance and thus represents a mere conclusory statement of the law. The focal
question seems to be whether the contracting party's conduct can be labelled as a sub-
stantive tort of interference or whether the conduct can be said to be in furtherance of
a design to interfere such that he may be held on a theory of conspiracy as though his
conduct were in itself tortious. The fact that the contracting party may also breach his
contract and the plaintiff may recover contractual damages is a question separate and
apart from questions of the breaching party's tort liability. The result of the decision,
though, is sound.
It is suggested, however, that a simpler and less dubious rationale would be the recog-
nition that when there are three or more parties to a contract, one or more of these
parties can assume the role of an interferer in the relations of other parties. It is note-
worthy that Professor Prosser seems to have missed the actual significance of the Kay
case. See PtossER, supra note 3, at 934 n.9.
A related factual problem would be presented by the situation wherein several persons,
each of whom has a separate contract with the plaintiff, combine and conspire to breach
these several contracts. This problem was examined in Hendricks v. Forshey, 9 S.E.
747 (W. Va. 1917), wherein plaintiff alleged that three defendants, each of whom had
a separate contract with plaintiff to haul milk, maliciously confederated and conspired
to refuse to permit plaintiff to haul their milk and in pursuance thereof breached their
several contracts causing damage to plaintiff's business. The trial court overruled de-
fendants' demurrer, and on appeal from this ruling, the reviewing court stated:
The contracts were several, not joint, and the wrong alleged is not simply the breaci
by each one of the defendants of his individual contract, but the breach of all of
them in consequence of the unlawful combination and conspiracy. "If one wan-
tonly and maliciously, . . . induce[s] a person to violate his contract with a third
person to the injury of that third person, it is actionable."
[D]efendants were induced to break their contracts by their concerted action and
agreement among themselves to haul their own milk.
Id. at 747-48 (citations omitted).
In Hendricks, the problem of whether or not a party can interfere with his ofn con-
tractual relations did not arise. There the defendants were each charged with interfer-
ence with contracts separate and independent of their own.
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tion are no different from the damages allowed in an action for breach
of contract;67 two, recovery may be allowed for damages proximately
resulting from the wrongful act as in negligence actions;6 and three,
the damages recoverable are the same as those for intentional torts and
include recovery for mental anguish and exemplary damages.6 9
In those jurisdictions where contract damages are the measure of re-
covery for interference with contractual relations,70 it would make little
difference whether a party 'to the contract is sued on a tort theory or
on a breach of contract theory. Other than possible statute of limita-
tions ramifications, 71 the plaintiff's case will be the same whether he
sues in tort or in contract, since in either case his recovery will be mea-
sured by those injuries reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time
they entered into the contract.72 In other jurisdictions where the courts
allow the same measure of recovery as in negligence or intentional tort
actions, the plaintiff may claim compensation not only for injuries fore-
seeable at the time of the wrongful act of interference,7" e.g., damage
to reputation, mental suffering, etc., but also for unforeseen expenses.
Additionally, punitive damages may be recoverable in tort actions74 but
are generally not recoverable in actions on a contract.7
67. Interference, supra note 43, at 140. See generally Note, Damages Recoverable in
an Action for Inducing Breach of Contract, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 232 (1930); note 43
supra.
The leading case of Hadley v. Baxendale [156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854)] lays
down the rule that damages for breach of contract can be recovered only for such
losses as were reasonably foreseeable, when the contract was made, by the party
to be charged. In other words, such losses must be either of the type usually result-
ing from breach of like contracts, or, if unusual, the circumstances creating the spe-
cial hazard must have been communicated to the defaulter before he made the bar-
gain.
C. McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 562 (1935) [hereinafter cited as
McCoRMICK].
68. Interference, supra note 43, at 140.
69 . Id.
70. E.g., Western Oil & Fuel Co. v. Kemp, 245 F.2d 633, 644 (8th Cir. 1957); Wil-
son & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 181 F. Supp. 809, 821-22 (N.D. Iowa
1960); McNutt Oil & Refining Co. v. D'Ascoli, 281 P.2d 966, 970-71 (Ariz. 1955).
71. See Trembath v. Digardi, 43 Cal. App. 3d 834, 118 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1974); Ki-
ang v. Strycula, 231 Cal. App. 2d 809, 42 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1965).
72. See Interference, supra note 43, at 146-47.
73. Id.
74. PRossER, supra note 3, at 949.
75. See, e.g., Young v. Main, 72 F.2d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1934); Fordson Coal Co.
v. Kentucky River Coal Corp., 69 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1934); Baumgarten v. Alliance
Assurance Co., 159 F. 275, 277 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1908); Schroeder v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 242 F. Supp. 787, 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 486,
196 P.2d 915, 918-19 (1948); Williams v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 294 S.W.2d 36,
40 (Mo. 1956); RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS § 342 (1932); cases collected in 11 S.
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Those jurisdictions which both allow tort recovery for interference
with contractual relations"8 and adopt the California view of holding a
party to a contract liable on a theory of interfering or conspiring to inter-
fere with a contract,77 necessarily arrive at the peculiar result of impos-
ing tort liability on one who has merely breached his contract. This
anomaly is clearly illustrated in the case of Luke v. Du Pree.7 8  In Du
Pree, owners of real property secretly sold -their property to a third
party, sidestepping the plaintiffs-brokers who had contracted with the
owners to receive the exclusive right to list and receive a commission
on the sale of the defendants' property and who had introduced them
to the -third party purchaser. The court discussed the liability of the
defendants on a theory of conspiracy:
Besides, it may seem anomalous that, if a party to a contract breaks it,
and is alone responsible for the breach, he can only be sued in an action
ex contractu for the breach; but, if he breaks the contract, and another
induces him to break it or conspires with him to break it, or aids him
in breaking it, both can be sued ex delicto, on the theory that both are
liable for a tort perpetrated in pursuance of a conspiracy to break the
contract.79
In both tort and contract actions, the primary purpose of an award
of damages is compensation. The goal of tort compensation is to give
to 'the person wronged a sum of money which, as nearly as possible,
will restore him to the position he would have occupied had the wrong
not been committed.8 0  The goal of contract compensation, however,
is not restoration but the awarding of a sum which is the equivalent
of full performance of the agreement-the attempt to place the
wronged party in the position he would be in if the terms of the contract
had been fulfilled.8'
Wi.LISTON, A TREATSE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 209-14 (3d ed. W. Jaeger ed. 1968)
[hereinafter cited as WILLiSTON]. See generally 5 A. CoRBIN, CoRBN ON CONTRACrTS
437-46 (1964).
76. See cases collected in PRossEr, supra note 3, at 948-49 nn.44-50.
77. See, e.g., Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1963); Blivas & Page, Inc. v. Klein, 282 N.E.2d 210 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972).
78. 124 S.E. 13 (Ga. 1924).
79. Id. at 16-17. The court, however, proceeded to point out that "the tendency of
modern decisions is to hold them [both the party to the contract and the inducer] liable
as conspirators. This is in harmony with sound morals." Id. at 17.
80. McCoRMwcn, supra note 67, at 560.
81. RESTATEmENT OF TORTS § 901 (1939); McCormick, The Contemplation Rule as
a Limitation Upon Damages for Breach of Contract, 19 MINN. L. R1v. 497 (1935)
[hereinafter cited as Contemplation]. See generally Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Inter-
est in Contract Damages (pts. 1-2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936).
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To the extent that these remedial goals are actually effectuated, the
damages caused by a breach of contract may be equally extensive as
those damages caused by a tort and sometimes may be greater when
the plaintiff is awarded the benefit of the bargain made rather than
merely compensation for a loss.82 Aside from pure cause-in-fact con-
siderations, the principles upon which damages depend, in both tort and
contract, attempt to strike
a balance between the claim to full reparation by the innocent party
[for all damages caused in fact] on the one hand and the need to limit
the wrongdoer's obligation to compensate for consequences which are
unacceptably [unexpected,] widespread or bizarre .... 83
Thus courts have developed different but similarly purposed doctrines
in the areas of tort and contract which serve as limitations on liability. s
The tort limitation on liability is the doctrine of proximate cause, 5
and the contract limitation on liability is the rule of Hadley v. Baxen-
dale86 which operates to restrict damages to those which were in the
"contemplation" of the parties at the time the contract was made.8
82. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 619. Prosser cites as an example the fraud cases in
jurisdictions which adopt the out-of-pocket measure of damages for deceit.
83. Byrom, Do Damages Depend on the Same Principles Throughout the Law of Tort
and Contract?, 6 U. QuEENsLN LJ. 118, 122 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Byrom].
84. Contemplation, supra note 81, at 498.
85. See generally Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); PROSSER,
supra note 3, at 244-90; Levitt, Cause, Legal Cause and Proximate Cause, 21 MicH. L.
REv. 34 (1922); Lewis, Proximate Cause in Law, 7 FLA. BJ. 109 (1933); Prosser, Pals-
graf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1953).
86. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
87. Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the
damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of con-
tract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising nat-
urally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract
itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation
of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the
breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was ac-
tually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known
to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which
they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would or-
dinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances so
known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances.
were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only
be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would
arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special cir-
cumstances, from such a breach of contract.
Id. at 151.
Professor McCormick described the response by American courts to the Hadley rule:
There has been but little variation of the original phraseology in the use of the
principle by American courts, whose opinions still repeat the formula that damages
are limited to the "natural and probable consequences" and those which in the light
of the facts of which they had knowledge were "in the contemplation" of the par-
ties. The same idea is occasionally expressed more simply and directly by stating
that damages may be given only for those consequences of the breach which were
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Duties to refrain from tortious activity are imposed by law and have
their roots in some public policy of the state.85 The person under such
a duty cannot negotiate the extent of the obligation he will assume, so
the scope of his liability can only be formulated in terms of what he
can foresee at the time he commits the act or omission alleged to be
a breach of duty. 89 On the other hand, contract duties are created and
circumscribed by -the contract; they are owed only to the parties to the
contract and concern those parties alone-not the state. 0°  The contrac-
tual duty is voluntarily undertaken, presumably after a comparison be-
"reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was entered into as probable if the
contract were broken."
Contemplation, supra note 81, at 504.
The author also indicates that the Hadley rule requires that the court apply an objec-
tive standard taking into account what the defendant who made the contract might have
reasonably foreseen within the context of the facts known to him, rather than limiting
the inquiry to those circumstances he actually did foresee. Id. at 502. If the loss occa-
sioning the damages is deemed unusual, then the question becomes one of defendant's
actual knowledge at the time he entered into the contract, i.e., whether or not he was
then able to foresee the precise circumstances which would cause the loss now com-
plained of. Id. at 507.
In application, the term "contemplation of the parties" has been held to exclude the
mere possibility of damages and requires that a reasonable person foresee the damage
as at least a serious possibility or as a real danger (see Victoria Laundry, Ld. v. New-
man Indus., Ld., [1949] 2 K.B. 528, 539-40; Monarch Steamship Co. v. Karlshamns
Oljefabriker, [1949] A.C. 196, 233-34; D. DOBBS, HADBooK ON THE LAv OF REMEDIES
812-14 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DOBBS]; Byrom, supra note 83, at 126-27. More
recently, in Koufos v. C. Czarnikow, Ltd. (The Heron II), [1967] 3 W.L.R. 1491, 1505
(H.L.), Lord Reid stated:
[fit is generally sufficient that that event would have appeared to the defendant
as not unlikely to occur. . . . [] do not find in that case [referring to Re Hall
and Pim, [1928] All E.R. 763], or in cases which preceded it, any warrant
for regarding as within the contemplation of the parties any event which would not
have appeared to the defendant, had he thought about it, to have a very substantial
degree of probability.
This latter case, as well as the Victoria Laundry case, has been cited as an indication
that "the days of a narrow construction of Hadley are over." DOBBS, supra at 813,
88. Reiner v. North Am. Newspaper Alliance, 181 N.E. 561, 565 (N.Y. 1932)
(Lehman, J., concurring).
89. Byrom, supra note 83, at 120.
90. Reiner v. North Am. Newspaper Alliance, 181 N.E. 561, 565 (N.Y. 1932)
(Lehman, J., concurring). Justice Lehman makes a noteworthy distinction between
contract and tort duties, referring to the latter as general duties rooted in some
public policy of the state and to the former as narrow duties not rooted in public policy:
The courts grant redress for failure to perform a contractual duty through [an]
award of damages and in some cases may decree specific performance of a contrac-
tual obligation; but denial of the benefit which would be derived from performance
of a contractual obligation voluntarily assumed concerns the public policy of the
state remotely, if at all. At least until the present time, the courts of this state
have not held that a breach of such obligation in itself contravenes the public pol-




tween the burdens and benefits occasioned by performance." The
contract breaker's scope of liability is measured by taking him back in
time to the formulation of the contract, limiting his liability to the conse-
quences which he reasonably could have contemplated, foreseen, or ex-
pected when he entered into the contract. 2
There are several reasons why -a person who merely breaches his
contract should benefit from the greater limits on liability afforded by
the Hadley rule. First, such a rule diminishes the risk of business en-
terprise and encourages trade insofar as people will more freely engage
in contractual relations if they feel secure that their liability for breach
is limited. 93  Second, both parties should contemplate the possibility
of a breach of contract when they enter into the agreement, and, there-
fore, they may be held to have impliedly agreed that damages should be
limited to those injuries within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of the making of the contract. 4  Third, in terms of fundamental
91. Byrom, supra note 83, at 121.
92. Id.
93. McCoRMICK, supra note 67, at 567; 30 COLUM. L. Rnv. 232, 240 (1930).
94. Interference, supra note 43, at 146. The author states:
While breach of contract actions preserve the plaintiff's interest in securing the
performance of the contract in accordance with the agreed terms, actions for inter-
ference with contractual relations preserve that interest from unjustified interference
by third persons not parties to the contract. Both parties should contemplate the
possibility of a breach of contract when they enter into the agreement, and gener-
ally an adequate remedy for a breach is readily available by an action in contract
for damages. However, unjustified interference with that contract by one not a
party is not contemplated when the original agreement is made. Such interference
may occur and the remedy sounds in tort not in contract.
Id. But see Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 543 (1902);
Daugherty v. American Union Tel. Co., 51 Am. Rep. 435 (Ala. 1883); 11 WILLISTON,
supra note 75, at 294-95; Contemplation, supra note 81, at 502 n.14 (1935).
It might be noted in passing that Professor Williston maintains resolutely that the
measure of damages for breach of contract is not based on the terms of the contradt
and what the parties contemplated at the time of entering into the contract, but rather
that the courts have imposed an equitable doctrine in these cases in order to alleviate
the hardship which may result when a serious and unexpected injury results from a
breach:
To assert then, as is sometimes done expressly or impliedly, that the measure of
damages for breach of a contract is based on the terms of the contract is to assert
a fiction which obscures the truth and invites misapprehension which may lead to
error. One who, on borrowing money, agrees to pay it the following month does
not stipulate for the alternative right to keep the money at legal interest until the
lender can get judgment and levy execution, although this is the only remedy the
law can enforce.
Parties generally have their minds addressed to the performance of contracts
not to their breach or the consequences which will follow a breach. The fiction
here criticized is a manifestation of the broader fiction that parties contract for
whatever obligations or consequences the law may impose upon them.
The true reason why notice to the defendant of the plaintiff's special circum-
stances is important is because, just as a court of equity under circumstances of
hardship arising after the formation of a contract may deny specific performance.
so a court of law may deny damages for unusual consequences where the defendant
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fairness, the injured party's claim is limited because he did not disclose
the special circumstances which caused the "kind" and "quantum"' ' 0 of
damages to exceed that which is reasonably contemplated. 96 These con-
was not aware when he entered into the contract how serious an injury would result
from its breach.
11 WILiSTON, supra note 75, at 294-95 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
Professor Bauer suggests that Williston's rationale seems to recognize a prima facie
right in a plaintiff to recover for all damage whatsoever resulting from the breach of
contract, with a mere equitable limitation to the effect that a showing that the damage
was not natural and probable or contemplated will prevent the imposition of damages
as compensation for such loss. Bauer, Consequential Damages in Contract, 80 U. PA.
L. REv. 687, 697 (1932). Professor Bauer opines that many courts of the period preced-
ing Hadley did recognize a prima facie right to recover for all damage resulting from
a breach.
95. Byrom perceptively distinguishes the foreseeability or foresight test employed by
the courts in limiting liability in tort from that employed in contract cases. Byrom, su-
pra note 83, at 119. He points out that in tort the test of foreseeability is used to deter-
mine the kind of consequence for which the wrongdoer will be held liable; for each cate-
gory of injury considered damages are recoverable in full or not at all, citing the cases
of the "eggshell skull" in personal injury, the "shabby millionaire" in the field of pecuni-
ary loss resulting from personal injury and the truism that "a tortfeasor cannot invoke
the plea that he had no reason to expect his casualty to be so expensive." Byrom asserts
that the contract test of foresight is used "mainly H not exclusively" to determine the
quantum or value of damages recoverable.
This commentator unqualifiedly agrees with the proposition that foreseeabiity in tort
is limited to the kind of damages recoverable and does not concern itself with the quan-
tum of damages recoverable, but questions whether or not the Hadley rule as applied
in contract cases is used exclusively for the purpose of limiting the quantum of damages.
It is suggested that the Hadley rule, at least under United States authorities, operates
to limit both the kind as well as the quantum of damages recoverable. Consider the
cases where the courts have applied the Hadley rule to preclude recovery for personal
injury (Miller v. Morse, 192 N.Y.S.2d 571, 576 (App. Div. 1959); Leavitt v. Twin
County Rental Co., 21 S.E.2d 890 (N.C. 1942); Timmons v. Williams Wood Prods.
Corp., 162 S.E. 329, 330-31 (S.C. 1932)), for mental anguish (McFarlin v. Gulf Stateg
Tel. Co., 257 S.W. 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1924)), for injury to reputation (Smith v. Beloit
Corp., 162 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Wis. 1968)), for product disparagement (Lanston Mono-
type Mach. Co. v. Times-Dispatch Co., 80 S.E. 736, 739 (Va. 1914)), for lost profits
(Stanley v. Tinsman, 187 A.2d 401, 403 (Me. 1963); Huler v. Nasser, 33 N.W.2d 637,
640 (Mich. 1948); Thermoid Rubber Co. v. Brictson, 163 N.W. 567 (S.D. 1917)), or
for conduct justifying the imposition of exemplary damages (see cases collected in note
75 supra).
96. This reason represents the most compelling rationale for the greater protection af-
forded a contract breaker under the Hadley rule than the protection afforded the tort-
feasor under the foreseeability rules of proximate cause. See Koufas v. C. Czarnikow,
Ltd. (The Heron II), [1967] 3 W.L.R. 1491, 1502-03 (H.L.); Byrom, supra note 83, at
130; Contemplation, supra note 81, at 506; 30 CoLUM. L. REv. 232, 240 (1930).
This rationale could quite appropriately be labelled "the duty of disclosure" as dis-
closure underlies the fundamental difference in the doctrines limiting liability in tort and
contract. As Professor Byrom suggests, the law makes its demand of the injured party
that,
[i]f he knows of factors which may take the consequences of breach of contract
beyond what is to be expected... the law demands that he disclose those factors
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siderations should apply regardless of the reasons for the defaulting
party's decision to breach his obligation. Moreover, a party to a con-
tract is often considered to have a "right" to breach his contract in the
sense that he must either perform or pay damages." Varying personal
or economic reasons motivate one to breach his contract, but the gen-
eral rule is that the motives of the defendant in breaching his contract
are immaterial and cannot be inquired into on the question of compen-
satory damages.98
The following illustrations highlight the unsupportability of the Cali-
fornia view in this regard:
Illustration 1:
X, a party to a contract with Y, is induced by Z to breach his con-
tract. X then breaches his contract with Y.
to the other party in time for that party to consider them as he assesses whether
or not it is worth his while to undertake the duty.
Byrom, supra note 83, at 121-22.
Lord Reid cogently articulated the same rationale by stating:
In contract, if one party wishes to protect himself against a risk which to the other
p arty would appear unusual, he can direct the other party's attention to it ....
n tort, however, there is no opportunity for the injured party to protect himself
in that way, and the tortfeasor cannot reasonably complain if he has to pay for
some very unusual but nevertheless foreseeable damage ....
Koufas v. C. Czarnikow, Ltd. (The Heron II), [1967] 3 W.L.R. 1491, 1502-03 (H.L.).
This duty of disclosure appears to be founded on the principle of fairness, i.e., if at
the time of contracting the injured party had knowledge of special circumstances and
an opportunity to relate them to the breaching party, it is only fair that, if he fails to
inform the breaching party of these special circumstances, he be precluded from recover-
ing for those consequences which the uninformed breaching party could not be expected
to anticipate. The breaching party should be afforded a fair chance to assess the signifi-
cance of his contractual undertaking. Denial of this opportunity provides justification
for the Hadley rule.
This principle of fairness requires that the duty of disclosure not be applied where
the injured party has no knowledge of the special circumstances or has no reason to con-
template the existence of such special circumstances. In such cases the injured party
cannot apprise the breaching party of special circumstances, and the equities favor com-
plete compensation of the innocent victim as in tort cases. Byrom, supra note 83, at
130.
97. See Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 543 (1903); Sor-
enson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 214 N.W. 754, 755 (Minn. 1927); Reiner v. North Am.
Newspaper Alliance, 181 N.E. 561, 563 (N.Y. 1932) (Pound, CJ., concurring); Bar-
bour, The Right to Break a Contract, 16 Micra. L. Rnv. 106 (1917); Holmes, The Path
of the Law, 10 HIAv. L. Rnv. 457, 462 (1897); 18 ConNn, L. REv. 84, 87 (1932).
98. See Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 547 (1903);
Baumgarten v. Alliance Assurance Co., 159 F. 275, 277 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1908); Pirchio
v. Noecker, 82 N.E.2d 838, 840 (Ind. 1948); Holland v. Spartanburg Herald-Journal
Co., 165 S.E. 203, 207 (S.C. 1932); 2 T. SEDGw CK, A TEAnTSE oN THE MEAsuxR oF
DAMAGES, 1162-63 (9th ed. A. Sedgwick & J. Beale eds. 1912); 1 J. SuT-ERLAND, A
TnREArsn oN THE LAw oF DAMAGES 286-87 (3d ed. 1903).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Illustration 2:
X, a party to a contract with Y, decides that his contract is not profit-
able enough and breaches his contract in search of more profitable
relations.
In Illustration 1, the California view will permit Y to recover tort
damages from X for conspiring to interfere, while in Illustration 2, Y's
recovery will be limited to contractual damages. Since the identical
act on X's part, a breach of contract, is involved in both illustrations
and since the combination itself is not the gist of the action, 9 the only
possible distinction between these illustrations would be -the actors' mo-
fives. If one does engage in an examination of motives and intent, it
is suggested that X is less morally culpable when he is tempted or in-
duced to breach his contract than when he intentionally or wilfully sets
out on his own to breach it.1°0 In both illustrations, X has merely
breached his contract and has caused identical damages to the plaintiff,
yet he will he held liable for tort damages under the California rule
when he succumbs to -the inducement of another and will be held liable
for the lesser contractual measure of damages when he acts alone with-
out inducement.
It is hoped that the courts will recognize and remedy this disparity
of treatment 'to the contract breaker. While the imposition of liability
in tort upon the non-party interferer may be justified in all cases for
his intentional disruption of the contractual relation, the party who
merely breaches his contract should in all cases be exposed only to con-
tractual liability as he has not assumed the role of an intentional inter-
ferer. To impose tort liability upon the contract breaker because of
the involvement of a third person (when liability is limited to contract
damages when the contract breaker is acting alone) undermines the
policies which have developed limited contractual liability.'01
99. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
100. The use of words with such emotive elements as "intentionally" or "wilfully" is
unavoidable. These words have acquired secondary meanings associated with concepts
of moral culpability which logically should have no place in a rational system of award-
ing damages. While the antecedents of modem damages theories relied openly on no-
tions of morality (see Sulnick, A Political Perspective of Tort Law, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
410, 412-13 (1974)), the modem tendency is to view damages as an objective method
of loss allocation, J. FLEMING, INTRODUCTIOX TO THm LAW oF TORTS 1 (1967). The
use of these emotionally charged descriptions of contract breaching are utilized some-
what purposefully as a direct rebuttal to the view that to hold a party to a contract liable
in tort for conspiring to interfere "is in harmony with sound morals" (see note 54 supra
and accompanying text) and to dispel any possible distinction between Illustrations 1
and 2 cited in the text.
101. See notes 93, 94 & 96 supra and accompanying text.
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D. More Than a "Mere" Breach
Any suggestion which 'has hitherto been made indicating that the lia-
bility of a party to a contract should be limited by the Hadley rule is
necessarily confined to conduct by that party constituting a "mere!'
breach of the contract. A mere breach of a contract can best be de-
fined both generally and negatively as an act or omission which can be
anticipated to go no further than to violate the terms of the contract-
a violation of contractual rights without attendant circumstances
amounting to a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing' 02 or another independent tort.'
0 3
When a contracting party seeks to breach his contract and his conduct
evidences such aggravating circumstances amounting to bad faith or an-
other independent tort, he should be subjected to tort liability, for the
policies favoring limited contractual liability would have no application
in such a case.'0 4 Likewise, when -the breaching party acts concertedly
with others to cause injuries more excessive than those occasioned by
a breach of contract, the doctrine of civil conspiracy should be available
to impose tort liability upon all parties to the conspiracy irrespective
of their degree of participation.
A good example of conduct undertaken by a contracting party in
combination with non-parties which exceeds the boundaries of what
may be considered a mere breach is cited in Motley, Green & Co. v.
Detroit Steel & Spring Co.' °5  The Motley court presented a factual
pattern wherein an employer of an actor drove the actor out of his em-
ployment and caused him to abandon or refuse to perform his contract.
It was alleged by the actor that his employer procured several persons
to come to the theatre to hoot and hiss at him.10 6 These persons inter-
rupted his performance and prevented him from exercising his profes-
sion and thereby caused the plaintiff to lose "divers gains and
102. A breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is commonly
referred to as "bad faith." In Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110
Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973), the court defines "bad faith" as follows:
Good faith implies honesty, fair dealing and full revelation .... Bad faith im-
plies dishonesty, fraud and concealment. . . . Neither mistaken judgment nor un-
reasonable judgment is the equivalent of bad faith.
Id. at 876, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
103. For a good example of an independent tort-intentional infliction of emotional
distress-attending a breach of contract, see Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10
Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
104. See notes 93, 94 & 96 supra and accompanying text.
105. 161 F. 389, 397 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908), quoting Z C. ADDISON, A TR"ATSn ON
run LAw oF ToRTS 739-40 (4th Eng. ed. 1876).
106. Id.
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emoluments" and to be brought into public scandal and disgrace. 10 7
Aside from the question of whether or not there existed a conspiracy
to interfere,108 these activities on behalf of the employer far exceeded
what could be referred to as a mere breach. The employer presumably
could have terminated the relationship by mere notice but instead chose
to breach his contract with conduct intended not only to cause a breach
of the contract, but also to defame and otherwise injure the actor.
Such conduct goes beyond the denial of a contractual benefit and ad-
vances to the status of an instrument of injury.
100
While such conduct may emanate from a contractual relationship, it
has not gone unremedied. Courts are increasingly implying a covenant
of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts generally, °10 with the re-
107. Id.
108. See note 62 supra.
109. In H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928), Justice
Cardozo drew the following analogous distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance:
If conduct has gone forward to such a stage that in action would commonly re-
suit, not negatively merely in withholding a benefit, but positively or actively in
working an injury, there exists a relation out of which arises a duty to go
forward. . . . The query always is whether the putative wrongdoer has advanced
to such a point as to have launched a force or instrument of harm, or has stopped
where inaction is at most a refusal to become an instrument for good.
Id. at 898.
110. Although the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing seems to have re-
cently taken a prominent position in the law of insurance contracts in California (see
Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 460, 521 P.2d 1103, 1108-09, 113
Cal. Rptr. 711, 716-17 (1974); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 575-77,
510 P.2d 1032, 1038-40, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 486-87 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co.,
66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967); Comunale v. Trad-
ers & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958); Merritt v. Reserve
Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 868, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 517-18 (1973); Fletcher v. West-
ern Nat1 Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93 (1970); see
generally Hills & Pivnicka, Development and Direction of the California Bad Faith In-
surance Doctrine or "0 Ye of Little Faith," 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 29 (1973); Note, Applying
the Bad Faith Doctrine to the Primary and Excess Insurance Carrier Relationship in
California, 7 Loy. L.A.L. Rnv. 277 (1974); Note, Contracting for Punitive Damages,
4 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 208 (1971)), it is a duty which is implied in every contract. See
Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949) (agreement
to make mutual wills); Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 750-51, 177 P.2d 931, 934
(1947) (partnership agreement); Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co.,
20 Cal. 2d 751, 771, 128 P.2d 665, 677 (1942) (agreement to sell and promote a ma-
chine); Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 1933)
(assignment of profits in the production of a play). See also Comunale v. Traders &
Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958); Parks & Heil, Insurers
Beware: "Bad Faith" is in Full Bloom, 9 FoRum 63 (1973); cases collected in 17A
CJ.S. Contracts § 328, at 286 n.40.5 (1963).
It has been stated that the duty of good faith between parties to an insurance contract
is somewhat greater than the duty implied in other contracts. Insurance contracts have
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sult that, if a contracting party acts in bad faith in violation of this
implied covenant, he will be exposed to tort liability notwithstanding
the fact that his conduct may also constitute a breach of contract."1 '
Moreover, courts have stood prepared ito award exemplary damages in
those exceptional cases where the breach amounts to an independent
wilful tort.1 1
2
traditionally been held to be "uberrima fides." See Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 277 U.S. 311, 316 (1928); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. McElroy, 83 F. 631,
636 (8th Cir. 1897). "Uberrima fides" is defined as follows:
The most abundant good faith; absolute and perfect candor or openness and hon-
esty; the absence of any concealment or deception, however slight. A phrase used
to express the perfect good faith, concealing nothing, with which a contract must
be made; for example, in the case of insurance, the insured must observe the most
perfect good faith towards the insurer.
BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 1690 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
A clear statement of the greater duty of good faith implied in limited liability insur-
ance contracts may be found in Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110
Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973):
This duty of good faith and fair dealing between parties to a liability insurance con-
tract is reciprocal, and it amounts to something more than the usual duty of good
faith between contracting parties, this for the reason that in limited liability insur-
ance contracts conflicts of interest between assured and carrier remain endemic to
their relationship, and whenever a conflict of interest breaks out the carrier becomes
obligated to protect the interests of the assured equally with its own.
id. at 868, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 517-18.
111. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 19 (1967); Fletcher v. Western Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401,
89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93 (1970). Contracts relating to matters which directly concern the
comfort, happiness, or personal welfare of a party thereto appear at first glance to be
a special but related category where extra-contractual recovery may be obtained for a
mere breach of contract. Courts have, however, allowed recovery in these cases for
physical suffering and illnesses proximately caused by the breach of contract on the the-
ory that such results would be within the contemplation of the parties at the time of
the making of the contract. Thus these cases merely reflect a logical extension of the
rule set forth in Hadley v. Baxendale. See Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 481-82,
196 P.2d 915, 916 (1948); Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers, 8 Cal. App. 3d 844, 851, 88
Cal. Rptr. 39, 44 (1970); Westervelt v. McCullough, 68 Cal. App. 198, 208-09, 228 P.
734, 738 (1924); Renihan v. Wright, 25 N.E. 822 (Ind. 1890).
112. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401-02,
89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93-94 (1970); Kuiken v. Garrett, 51 N.W.2d 149, 158 (Iowa 1952);
Burrus v. Nevada-California-Oregon Ry., 145 P. 926, 929 (Nev. 1915), appeal dis-
missed, 244 U.S. 103 (1917); Forrester v. Southern Pac. Co., 134 P. 753, 760-61 (Nev.
1913); Wellborn v. Dixon, 49 S.E. 232, 234 (S.C. 1904); Southwestern Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Stanley, 70 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Tex. 1934). See generally Note, Contracting for
Punitive Damages, 4 LoY. L.A.L. RIv. 208 (1971).
In a recent case, Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103,
113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974), the California Supreme Court ruled that, although an insurer
violated its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing toward its insured, this tortious
act alone did not necessarily establish that the defendant acted with the requisite intent
necessary to impose exemplary damages. The court stated:
It does not follow that because plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages that
he is also entitled to exemplary damages. In order to justify an award of exemp-
lary damages, the defendant must be guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
In Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.,"'3 a California
court dealt with an insurer that not only breached its contract with the
insured, but also engaged in conduct constituting intentional infliction
of emotional distress. 114  The court made a discerning analogy"' to
the tort of interference with contractual relations:
If a third person, a legal stranger to plaintiff, were to interfere with
plaintiff's rights under the insurance policy by conduct and with pur-
poses similar to defendants' in the case at bench, that person would be
liable to plaintiff in damages for all detriment proximately caused
thereby, both economic loss and emotional distress and, in a proper case,
could be assessed punitive damages. There is no sound reason why
plaintiff's legally recognized interests should receive less protection from
interference by the insurer itself, which has a special duty to plaintiff
Id. at 462, 521 P.2d at 1110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 718, citing CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294 (West
1970).
113. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
114. In Fletcher, after paying premiums for two years on a disability insurance con-
tract, the insured was injured and placed on disability by his employer. The insurer
began to make benefit payments until a new claims supervisor was hired. The new
supervisor sent a series of letters to the insured claiming that his condition was congeni-
tal and therefore payable under the sickness provision of the policy which limited pay-
ments. The letters also accused the insured of material misrepresentation in completing
his application form and demanded the return of all benefits paid thus far unless the
insured accepted a compromise offer.
The evidence adduced at the trial disclosed a complete absence of investigation by the
insurance company concerning the insured's congenital defect, as well as a complete ab-
sence of facts supporting the insured's knowledge of his condition. Id. at 389, 89 Cal.
Rptr. at 85.
115. In Note, Contracting for Punitive Damages, 4 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 208 (1971), the
author, referring to this analogy, commented:
An action for interference has never been extended to a party to the contract. If
the Fletcher court's reasoning were logically extended, then every party who would
breach his contract with another would be liable, not only for his breach (in an
action on the contract) but would also be held for intentionally interfering with
a contractual relation and be subject to exorbitant liability in damages. This is
surely not what the court was driving at by making their analogy.
Id. at 227 n.102 (citation omitted).
This writer suggests that the first sentence quoted above is less than accurate. See
note 49 supra and accompanying text. This writer further submits that the court was
not driving at a rule which would impose tort liability for a mere breach of a contract;
the court was merely stating that if a third party engaged in the disgraceful conduct
which the insurer (party to the insurance contract) was found to have committed, an
action for interference would necessarily lie. Implicit in the court's rationale is the sug-
gestion that if both a legal stranger and a party to a relationship act in an equally tor-
tious manner, their liability should be commensurate-the stranger's tort liability arising
from the tort of interference with contractual relations and the breaching party's tort
liability arising from the tort committed or from a breach of a duty of good faith. The
court's language, however, unfortunately implies that the breaching party should be held
liable for the tort of interference with contractual relations.
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of good faith and fair dealing, nor is there any reason why plaintiff's
insurer should be held to a lower standard of conduct than a stranger.",6
The courts reasoning succinctly suggests the remedy available to a
non-breaching party to a contract when the breaching party's conduct
rises to the status of a tort. This so-called "interference" by the party
to the contract above and beyond a mere breach is none other than
an independent tort or a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. The result 'may be the same whether such conduct
is referred to as interference or bad faith, but much confusion will be
avoided if accurate designations are utilized.117
116. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 403, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94-95 (citation omitted).
117. A California Supreme Court case which is worthy of attention is Buxbom v.
Smith, 23 Cal. 2d 535, 145 P.2d 305 (1944). In that case, the plaintiff brought suit
against several defendants alleging that they had breached two contracts of employment:
a contract employing plaintiff to publish a newspaper and a contract to distribute that
newspaper. Plaintiff alleged that immediately after the contracts were executed, plain-
tiff solicited advertising, enlarged his distribution crews, employed additional supervisors,
and otherwise prepared to handle the distribution of 40,000 copies of the newspaper, and
that after defendants breached their contracts, they employed plaintiff's distributing
crews and supervisors. The trial court awarded plaintiff $4,000 for the loss of plaintiffs
trained organization, supervisors, and goodwill and for general damages to plaintiff's
business.
Defendants appealed from this result, arguing that such an award could only be made
in an action sounding in tort-that it had no place in a contract action. The court on
appeal reviewed the evidence and found that defendants had committed tortious acts.
The court pointed out that defendants gained an unfair advantage over plaintiff through
deceptive dealings in the form of a contractual arrangement whereby they deliberately
induced plaintiff to build up his distributing organization to a level consistent with the
advertising needs of their then non-competing business. Having obtained complete
knowledge of his business methods and records through their employment agreement
with plaintiff, they then undertook to terminate their relationship with him, hired his
crews, and assumed control of his valuable enterprise. The court stated:
Although defendant's conduct may not have been tortious if he had merely broken
the contract and subsequently decided to hire plaintiff's employees, an additional
factor is present in this case. From the evidence the trial court could reasonably
infer that the breach, at the time it was made, was intended as a means of facili-
tating defendant's hiring of plaintiff's employees. A breach of contract is a wrong
and in itself actionable. It is also wrongful when intentionally utilized as the
means of depriving plaintiff of his employees, and, in our opinion, constitutes an
unfair method of interference with advantageous relations ....
Id. at 548, 145 P.2d at 311.
Although Buxbom involves interference with the plaintiff's business advantages with
his employees, it is also an illustration of a factual situation where recovery could have
been based on defendants' bad faith performance of their contract with plaintiff. Sup-
pose, for purposes of analysis, that defendants in Buxbom did not hire away plaintiffs
employees but rather breached the contract solely for the purpose of utilizing the com-
plete knowledge of plaintiff's business methods acquired during the course of the con-
tract, leaving plaintiff with a substantial investment in winding-up costs and without the
benefits of defendants' promised performances. Such conduct would not involve any ele-
ment of interference but would clearly constitute a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing which exists in every contract.
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Once courts recognize that the bad faith or tortious conduct of -a party
to a contract is not interference but rather a breach of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing or another independent tort, then
hopefully they will hesitate before imposing conspiracy-tort liability on
a party to the contract for interference with contractual relations when
that party's sole act is a mere breach.
E. A Logical Inconsistency
Further support for the New York view may be derived from the
logical inconsistency resulting from a simple application of the Califor-
nia view to a variation of the typical case of interference with contrac-
tual relations. A well-established rule in the law of interference with
contractual relations is that the underlying contract need not be an
enforceable one for the plaintiff to have standing to maintain an action
for interference against third party interferers.118 As long as the con-
tract is not illegal 1 9 or against public policy, 20 the courts will assume
that, but for the interference, the parties to the contract would have
voluntarily performed their obligations thereunder despite the fact that
these obligations would not be recognized in a court of law. The ra-
tionale for this rule may be found in Harris v. Perl,121 where the New
Jersey Supreme Court concisely stated the rule:
118. [lit usually is held that contracts which are voidable by reason of the statute of
frauds, formal defects, lack of consideration, lack of mutuality, or even uncertainty
of terms, or harsh and unconscionable provisions, or conditions precedent to the ex-
istence of the obligation, can still afford a basis for a tort action when the defend-
ant interferes with their performance.
PRossER, supra note 3, at 932 (footnotes omitted). But see Sacks v. Martin Equip.
Corp., 130 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1955); Morgan v. Speight, 89 S.E.2d 137 (N.C. 1955)
(criticized in 58 W. VA. L. Rav. 302 (1956)).
It seems correct to say that when the defect in the contract lies in its formation so
that a contract never came into existence, an action for interference with contractual
relations should not lie .(see Alice v. Robett Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 1377 (N.D. Ga.
1970), affd, 445 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1971); Williams v. DeMan, 151 N.W.2d 247
(Mich. Ct. App. 1967); Overlock v. Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 237 A.2d 356 (Vt.
1967)), but this should not preclude an action for interference with prospective business
advantage.
119. Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n, 12 S.E.2d 602, 610 (Ga. 1940); Revlon Prods.
Corp. v. Bernstein, 119 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1953); PROSSER, supra note 3, at 931 n.72;
24 CAr.F. L. REv. 208, 212-13 (1936); 89 U. PA. L. Rnv. 991-92 (1941).
120. E.g., Advance Indus. Security Inc. v. William J. Burns Detective Agency, Inc.,
377 F.2d 236, 238 (5th Cir. 1967); Hansen v. Barrett, 183 F. Supp. 831, 833 (D. Minn.
1960); Mindenberg v. Carmel Film Prods., 132 Cal. App. 2d 598, 602, 282 P.2d 1024,
1027 (1955); Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n, 12 S.E.2d 602, 610 (Ga. 1940); 86 CJ.S.
Torts § 44 (1954); PRossai, supra note 3, at 931 n.73.
121. 197 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1964). See also Golden v. Anderson, 256 Cal. App. 2d 714,
719, 64 Cal. Rptr. 404, 407 (1967).
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[O1ne who unjustifiably interferes with the contract of another is guilty
of a wrong. - And since men usually honor their promises no matter what
flaws a lawyer can find, the offender should not be heard to say the
contract he meddled with could not have been enforced.
122
This principle has likewise been applied to unenforceable contracts
"at the will" of the parties where the courts have often stated that "the
fact that the contract is at the will of the parties, does not make it at
the will of others."'
123
Thus the tort of interference with contractual relations will stand by
itself irrespective of the insufficiency of the underlying contract. In
the California case of Patterson v. Philco Corp.,2 4 however, a plaintiff
brought suit against his employer (Philco) and his fellow employee
(Joyce) for damages for his alleged wrongful discharge on an apparent
theory of conspiracy to interfere with contractual relations. The court
preliminarily noted that the demurrer of Joyce was properly overruled
since it was alleged that he was acting in a personal capacity,125 which
presumably would preclude a finding that he was acting on behalf of
the corporation.'2 6 In his brief, plaintiff conceded that his employment
with Philco was terminable at will. - The court affirmed the trial court's
order dismissing Philco, concluding that, although there is California
authority that a conspiracy will lie against a party -to a contract for con-
122. 197 A.2d at 363.
123. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 38 (1915); American Sur. Co. v. Schottenbauer,
257 F.2d 6, 10-11 (8th Cir. 1958); Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d
34, 39-40, 172 P.2d 867, 870 (1946); Childress v. Abeles, 84 S.E.2d 176, 184 (N.C.
1954); 36 TEMP. L.Q. 237, 239 (1963). See generally Zelinger v. Uvalde Rock Asphalt
Co., 316 F.2d 47, 50-51 (10th Cir. 1963); Gruen Watch Co. v. Artists Alliance, 191
F.2d 700, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1951); cases collected in Annot., 84 A.L.R. 43, 60 n.f.
(1933), supplemented by 26 A.L.R.2d 1227, 1258 (1952); 25 BROOK. L. REv. 73 (1958);
33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 238 (1958).
124. 252 Cal. App. 2d 63, 60 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1967).
125. Id. at 65, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
126. The court's finding rests on the immunity which corporate officers, directors;
and employees enjoy while acting on behalf of the corporation----sometimes referred to
as the "freedom of action rule." See Buckley v. 112 Central Park S., Inc., 136 N.Y.S.2d
233, 237 (App. Div. 1954). Under this rule any interference with a corporation's con-
tract by an officer, director or employee of the corporation who is acting in the good
faith belief that he is furthering the interests of the corporation is privileged. See gen-
erally Zelinger v. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co., 316 F.2d 47, 52 (10th Cir. 1963);
Hare v. Family Publications Sere. Inc., 334 F. Supp. 953, 959 (D. Md. 1971); Allison
v. American Airlines, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 37, 38 (N.D. Okla. 1943); Vassardakis v. Par-
ish, 36 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d
566, 576, 510 P.2d 1032, 1039, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 487 (1973); Becket v. Welton Becket
& Associates, 39 Cal. App. 3d 815, 823, 114 Cal. Rptr. 531, 535 (1974); Wise v. South-
ern Pac. Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 72, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652, 665 (1963); Greyhound Corp.
v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.S.2d 239, 241-42 (App. Div. 1940).
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spiring to induce its breach,12 7 "[plaintiffs] employment was 'at will'
and does not come within that class of cases which hold that a conspir-
acy action will he against a party to the contract ....
In a case involving an unenforceable contract terminable at will, Cali-
fornia has inconsistently concluded that a party to the contract cannot
be held liable for conspiring to interfere. This result it is suggested,
demonstrates an unspoken admission that when an enforceable contract
is involved, under the California view, the party to the contract is held
liable in tort solely for the mere act of breaching a contract. Although
a party to an unenforceable contract may have combined, plotted, and
planned with the interferer (acts which, under the California view,
would be considered to be participation in a conspiracy -to interfere),
these acts are suddenly ignored where the party to the contract cannot
be said to have breached his contract. In the absence of a breach of
contract, there is an opportunity to examine the charge of conspiracy
to interfere independently and in its own right. The Patterson court
recognized the potential liability of the non-party defendant Joyce for
acts constituting interference, but declined to recognize the same liabil-
ity of the party defendant Philco, since the latter did not and could not
breach the employment contract with the plaintiff. It is suggested that
the Patterson court unwittingly sensed the emptiness of a charge of con-
spiracy to interfere which is levelled against a party to a contract.
Logically, there is no reason why an action for conspiracy to interfere
should not lie irrespective of the enforceability of the underlying con-
tract since the tort of interference will exist without regard to the en-
forceability of the contract in question. On the other hand, if under
facts similar to those in Patterson, a party to the contract is charged
as a defendant with conspiracy to breach his contract, then the result
of the Patterson case would be sound. It is quite obvious that an unen-
forceable contract cannot be breached, and, accordingly, there can be
no conspiracy to effect its breach. The Patterson case can perhaps be
read as teaching either or both of the following: first, that when the
courts say "conspiracy to interfere" while joining a party to the contract
as a defendant, they really mean "conspiracy to breach";'2 or, second,
if the courts really mean what they say when using the term "conspiracy
127. 252 Cal. App. 2d at 67, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 113, citing Wise v. Southern Pae. Co.,
223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1963).
128. 252 Cal. App. 2d at 68, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
129. A good example of a case adopting the California view which uses the terms
"conspiracy to breach" and "conspiracy to interfere" interchangeably is Mills v. Murray,
472 S.W.2d 6, 13-14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
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to interfere" while joining a party to the contract as a defendant, they
reach a logical inconsistency and are at a loss to impose liability in the
unenforceable contract cases when a breach does not and cannot oc-
cur. 80  Either of the above interpretations lends support to the New
York view. The first more directly and the second indirectly by expos-
ing an inherent flaw in the California view.
IV. CONCLUSION
Civil conspiracy, except in unusual circumstances, 1 ' must properly
be placed in perspective, not as a tort or a wrong in and of itself, but
as an adjective describing the concerted nature of recognized forms of
injury which produces remediall s3 and evidentiary'83 consequences.
An understanding of this concept will more readily enable one to distin-
guish between conspiracy to breach and conspiracy to interfere as two
independent wrongs. Conspiracy to breach should in all cases be appli-
cable to a party to a contract as well as to non-parties who may be con-
currently liable for contractual damages regardless of their degree of
activity. 3 4 In most cases these non-parties may alternatively be held
liable in tort damages for interference with contractual relations, but
theoretically an injured party could nevertheless proceed on a conspir-
acy theory against parties and non-parties alike for breach of con-
tract.' 35 Conspiracy to interfere, on the other hand, should not be
applicable to a party to a contract.'8 6
An attempt has been made to illustrate the conceptual difficulties
with a rule which recognizes that one may interfere with his own con-
tract;8 7 however, the primary objection to the California view can be
found in its arbitrary and illogical imposition of tort damages upon a
party who is said to have merely breached his contract. Although the
New York view expresses the more tenable rule, such a position should
not be interpreted as a perfunctory adherence to traditional contract
and tort distinctions.
130. Further support for the New York view may be found from the lack of
any case law holding a party to an expectancy (which has not yet reached con-
tractual form) liable for conspiracy to interfere with this prospective business rela-
tionship. Such a situation would be most analogous to the unenforceable contract cases
inasmuch as the party to the relationship cannot be found liable for breach of contract.
131. See notes 25, 27 & 28 supra and accompanying text.
132. See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text.
133. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
134. See notes 64-65 supra and accompanying text.
135. See note 65 supra.
136. If multiple parties are involved, the conclusion is the opposite. See note 64
supra.
137. See text accompanying notes 55-66, 118-30 supra.
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The Hadley rule is founded upon sound principles'"8 limiting liability
for a mere breach of contract, and when conduct incident to a con-
tractual relationship exceeds a mere breach, other remedies have been
fashioned 'to adequately compensate the victim and punish the wrong-
doer. 139  The California view is thus unnecessary if its goal is to afford
extra-contractual recovery for aggravated conduct exceeding a mere
breach. Moreover, in cases of a mere breach of contract, the California
view serves only to engender disparate and inconsistent judicial treat-
ment of contract breakers-such treatment being founded upon no ra-
tional or moral basis.
Brand Lawless Cooper
138. See notes 92-96 supra and accompanying text.
139. See notes 109-17 supra and accompanying text,
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